## Case

### Adv 1

#### Sanctions are targeted and effective---pressure forces Iranian compromise.

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Brian H, 12-12-2019, "A Conversation With Brian Hook," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-brian-hook

This is a speech that has been some time coming. And I want to discuss the economic impacts of our maximum pressure campaign by examining Iran’s economy, the regime’s government budget, its access to foreign exchange reserves, and the role that corruption plays in Iran’s economy. More than one year after the re-imposition of American sanctions, the United States is depriving this regime of historic levels of revenue. Because of our pressure, Iran’s leaders are facing a decision they have not confronted seriously since the 1980s: Either negotiate and compromise or manage economic collapse.

The Islamic Republic’s economy shares many of the same features as a corruption racket. The revenue schemes and shadow financial networks that the supreme leader oversees enrich the regime’s ruling class while undermining opportunity for everyone else. These networks divert resources away from the people and fund a range of illicit and destabilizing activities from terrorist groups in Lebanon, to proxy wars in Yemen, to threatening ballistic missile and nuclear programs.

Unprecedented American sanctions are exposing this regime’s corruption and exploiting structural deficiencies in its financial networks. Our sanctions are meaningfully targeting the revenue streams the clerics rely on to foment sectarian violence, suffering in Iran, suffering in the region, and, because Iran has conducted terrorist operations across five continents, around the world. Iran’s leaders bear responsibility for how they choose to spend the Iranian people’s money, and for the state of their nation’s economy, and the stagnation of the Iranian people’s livelihoods that result.

Iran’s clerics have had four decades to build an economy based on transparency. Yet, they have deliberately chosen to take a different path. They instead use the nation’s economy as a bank to finance their revolution and expansionist foreign policy, thereby exposing it to our financial pressure. Iran’s economy is opaque by design. There is a reason reformers in Iran too often find themselves cast out or incarcerated. The clerical establishment prefers the current system to meaningful changes that would benefit its own people.

Recently the clerics derailed efforts to adopt international anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing standards that would bring transparency to Iran’s banking sector. To almost every country in the world these standards are normal and commonsense. But Iran’s leaders view them as unnecessary and imposing. They continue to resist transparency because they know it will expose the regime to real scrutiny, which would conform—which would confirm what we already know, that the regime uses the Iranian economy to finance and spread its violent revolution and to make the regime elite wealthier.

This is partly why President Trump re-imposed sanctions on Iran, to deprive the clerical rulers of revenue and to disrupt their financial networks. When he did, many experts said that by acting alone the United States could not and would not bring sufficient pressure to bear on this regime’s economic interests. They also said our sanctions would cause protests against the United States as the Iranian people rallied around the flag and the regime. These experts were wrong. The sanctions we have imposed on the regime are the toughest ever and they are making an enormous difference. Sanctions on Iran’s oil sector are at the core of our economic pressure. And for as long as we were in the Iran nuclear deal we were unable to impose oil sanctions.

This regime has relied on oil more than any other export to support its destabilizing activities. Our sanctions on Iran’s oil sector, which were only fully imposed in May, have driven Iran’s oil exports to levels not seen since the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Iran’s oil exports have decreased by more than two million barrels per day, driving down Iran’s oil—revenue from oil by more than 80 percent. This amounts to a loss of more than $30 billion per year, with a total loss likely exceeding $50 billion since May of 2018.

Since Iran can no longer find legitimate buyers for its crude oil, it is turning increasingly to evasive practices such as falsifying documents and turning off maritime AIS transponders for its tankers. This strategy will fail to make up for its declining exports. The United States is working closely with nations and industry to educate the maritime and energy sectors about Iran’s evasive practices and potential exposure to U.S. sanctions, if they fail to do their diligence. We are raising awareness of best practices and encouraging entities to adopt appropriate controls to avoid sanctions risks. As we have said, if we see any sanctionable activity, we will take action.

Iran is also running out of options to store the oil it is unable to export. This has forced the regime to shut in its production and increase the amount of crude oil and condensate it sends to refineries and to petrochemical facilities. The regime is hoping to compensate for the fall in crude exports by increasing its output of refined products. But here too our enforcement is adapting, and we are confident that Iran’s refined product and petrochemical sectors—customers will continue to stay away once they are made aware of the risks.

Even as Iran tries to increase its exports of refined products, the regime is facing significant logistical constraints. Iranian tankers are increasingly being used as floating storage, making them unavailable to transport refined products to begin with. Our sanctions are also restricting Iran’s investment in its oil and gas sector, which will have a lasting impact beyond the immediate loss of revenue from the reduction in imports. Both upstream and downstream investments in Iran’s oil and gas sector have stopped. Foreign investments have almost entirely pulled out of Iran due to the risks. Billions of investment has been lost.

While domestic Iranian companies are taking over some of the projects left behind, they are not able to replicate the role of more experienced international oil companies and investors. As time goes on, the impact of our sanctions on Iran’s energy sector will continue to increase. Iran will not be able to make the investments it needs to maintain long-term energy production. The longer the regime chooses to reject diplomacy, the greater the impact will be on its future oil and gas production and revenues.

The decline in energy exports is an important place to start this discussion because it is having a profound impact on the regime’s ability to continue business as usual. The effects have been most pronounced in three key areas: Iran’s economic growth, the regime’s annual budget, and its access to foreign currency. So I’ll first talk about the economy. Last year in 2018 Iran’s economy contracted by about 5 percent. This year Iran’s economy will likely shrink by at least 9.5 percent, according to the IMF. This would be the steepest single year decline in more than thirty years. Some analysts have projected an even steeper contraction, possibly as high as 12-14 percent.

This would put the Iranian economy on the verge of a depression. The IMF and World Bank’s projections place Iran’s economy as the third worst in the world, behind Libya and Venezuela. However, the assumptions underlining even these dismal projections may be optimistic. The IMF has assumed that Iran will average oil exports of six hundred thousand barrels a day. This vastly exceeds Iran’s oil exports since May and is beyond what Iran will export under our sanctions. The IMF and others have repeatedly revised down their growth projections for Iran over the course of the last year. This will almost certainly happen again.

Inflation has also increased and is currently running at 40 percent overall. This is affecting the price of essential household goods significantly. To make matters worse, while Iran manages an official exchange rate the parallel open market exchange rate shows over 50 percent depreciation since May of 2018. The large gap between official and open market exchanges creates corrupt arbitrage opportunities that well-connected importers exploit for private gain. Yet, when ordinary Iranians seek to purchase foreign goods with their weakened currency they are now paying a steep premium.

Iran’s declining growth is having ripple effects throughout the country. Pension funds are coming under increasing strain. Of the eighteen existing retirement funds in Iran, seventeen are in the red. As Iran’s elderly population continues to grow and employment stagnates, these funds will come under greater pressure. Many analysts have compared the current economic decline under this regime’s watch to prior round—to the prior round of sanctions imposed before the nuclear deal was finalized in 2015. However, Iran’s recession today is far worse than it was in 2012. That is when its economy contracted by 6 percent. The more appropriate comparison, as the data suggests, is the opening phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 to 1981, which severely disrupted Iran’s oil production and exports.

Second thing I’d like to discuss is the low—how the low exports are putting unprecedented pressure on the regime’s government budget. Due to the staggering loss of oil revenue, it is nearly impossible for the regime to put forward a credible budget. Oil export revenues typically comprise at least 30 percent of Iran’s revenues. Our sanctions are bringing this figure closer to zero percent. After initially assuming oil exports would average 1.5 million barrels of oil a day in fiscal year 2019, the regime later revised this figure down to only three hundred thousand. It is surprising then that the draft budget released just this month for Iran’s next fiscal year assumes oil exports will average around 1 million barrels per day. This is fantasy. It is an unrealistic forecast. Iran’s budget proposal is so off base that it spooked the Iranian market. The rial hit a six-month low against the dollar shortly after Iran released its government budget.

Iran has attempted over the past year to respond to budget shortfalls by cutting spending and resorting to stopgap measures to raise additional revenue, which it very much needs. These include raiding its sovereign wealth fund, issuing even more domestic debt, attempting to privatize additional state assets, and slashing subsidies. Recently Iran’s financial desperation forced the government to raise gasoline prices in an effort to save money and to increase exports. As the protests last month demonstrated, it will be difficult for the regime to implement further subsidy cuts without sparking even greater frustration among Iranians.

So where will the regime find the money? It would make more sense for the regime to close the revenue gap by plugging holes to tax collection from Iran’s wealthy elite, or by expanding the tax base to include religious and IRGC-linked holding companies that dominate Iran’s economy, and yet pay no taxes. The regime is choosing instead to shift the burden onto the middle class. The regime must also grapple with how to keep its subsidized industries afloat. Iran is one of the most heavily subsidized nations in the world. More than 70 percent of Iran’s budget expenditures are allocated to underperforming state-owned enterprises which make up the bulk of Iran’s economy. And audit by the Supreme Audit Court for 2016 to 2017 that—showed that 162 of 377 state-owned enterprises were, quote, “economically unviable.” The real number is likely much higher.

This suggests that as Iran’s oil sector shrinks the Iranian regime will be unable to continue subsidizing its vast sector of underperforming non-oil industries, just as it is struggling to subsidize gas prices. The government is running out of emergency measures to take or off-budget funds to raid. Moving forward the regime will be less and less able to respond to continued pressure. No creative number-crunching can change the fact that this regime’s coffers are running dry. Short-term fixes will only exacerbate inflation and do nothing to address the structural deficiencies in Iran’s economy. If the regime insists on continuing to divert resources to fund terrorist activity or ballistic missile development ultimately it will be forced to choose between printing money or delaying spending on development, salaries, and benefits.

The Iranian people have been demanding for a long time that the regime stop investing in wars and terrorism abroad and start spending more money at home. Now is an opportunity for the regime to do that, or the regime will face greater pressure from its own people. The recent protests were costly for Iran’s economy. The regime’s unprecedented decision to shut down the internet for a week also created losses for the economy as high as $700 million in e-commerce sales and missed business opportunities.

Last thing I’d like to put—take a look at is the access to foreign exchange reserves. As exports decline the third major impact on the regime has been reduced access to foreign currency. The regime is already struggling to acquire the foreign currency it needs to procure imports such as machinery, industrial imports, and consumer goods—industrial inputs. Prior to the re-imposition of sanctions Iran relied on oil exports for around 50 percent of its foreign currency earnings. Much of the remainder came from petrochemicals, metals, and refined petroleum products. All of these exports are now subject to sanctions.

According to U.S. government analysis, Iran currently has around $100 billion in foreign exchange reserves. Of that, only 10 percent is immediately accessible to Iranian authorities. That is $10 billion. Many exports—many experts have failed to appreciate the difference between reserves and access to reserves. That difference is $90 billion. Given the current sanctions on all of Iran’s top revenue-generating exports, this is simply not sustainable for the regime.

The fact that Iran’s access to foreign currency is declining is all the more dire given last year’s collapse in the rial’s value. The rial has fallen over 50 percent at the market exchange rate since May of 2018. Iranian authorities may be compelled to spend reserves to prevent further depreciation as pressures mount on the rial, even as the regime is increasingly seeking to protect its dwindling accessible foreign currency reserves. By the end of October, Iran’s commerce ministry had banned the import of over 1,500 goods, ostensibly to reduce pressures to spend foreign currency.

Today the Iranian economy has devolved into a kleptocracy which protects the privilege of regime elites while leaving the vast majority of Iranians behind. Although Iran’s clerics promised economic prosperity and social equality after the revolution in 1979, the Iranian people know all too well that neither have been delivered. Massive clerical hedge funds—there aren’t many religious leaders who have a hedge fund—massive clerical hedge funds or so-called charitable foundations worth tens of billions of dollars are just one aspect of Iran’s dark economy. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has its tentacles in nearly every sector of Iran’s economy.

This is despite a strong declaration from the regime’s first supreme leader, who cautioned that the IRGC should stay out of politics and the economy. Quite the opposite has happened. After forty years, the autocratic rule of the ayatollahs is proving to be an economic catastrophe for the Iranian people. It has robbed Iranians of what should have been decades of progress and prosperity. To summarize, exports are down, the economy is in deep contraction, the budget is facing unprecedented pressures it cannot fix, and access to foreign reserves is minimal.

Most importantly, however, the Iranian people have had enough. Hundreds of thousands of them took recently to the streets in one of the largest protest movements in the Islamic Republic’s history. This followed an unexpected hike in gasoline prices. In cities around the country Iranians joined to demand accountability, reform, and transparency. Many were killed. Many were injured. And many were jailed. The supreme leader dismissed the protesters as “thugs,” which tells you something about how the regime elite think of their own people. But the real thugs are the security officials who fired on unarmed protesters and committed massacres.

The Iranian people understand better than most that their government’s policies are the root cause of Iran’s economic stagnation. When the Iranian people peacefully demand a better life and a more representative government, they are mowed down and brutally silenced. The Iranian people view their government with skepticism and deep frustration. The regime has simply lost all credibility. Again, it has only itself to blame. The Islamic Republic rewards corrupt officials more often than it punishes them.

Our sanctions are exploiting these structural deficiencies to deprive the—to deprive the regime of revenue. We are exposing this regime’s corruption, revealing its gross mismanagement, and we are holding accountable those privileged insiders who have, for decades, profited off the backs of the proud Iranian people. We very much hope that at the end of this economic sanctions—this economic pressure campaign and diplomatic isolation that the regime will start making better choices.

When the president let the Iran deal, Secretary Pompeo gave a speech announcing our new policy. And he made very clear that Iran faces a choice. And this is a year—this is in May of 2018. The regime can either come to the table and negotiate or it can watch its economy collapse. And the supreme leader has chosen collapse. And we very much hope that we can get to the negotiating table with the regime. We have made clear that if we can conclude an agreement that addresses all of Iran’s threats to peace and security, that we will submit it as a treaty to the Senate. We will end all of our sanctions. We will restore diplomatic ties with Iran and exchange ambassadors and welcome them into the international community.

But the agreement has to come first. And in the meantime, we know that this regime is weaker, and its proxies are weaker, today than when this administration came into office three years ago. We recognize that diplomatic isolation and economic pressure is very much—it’s a—it is a necessary response to this regime. We tried sanctions relief and the regime exploited that and, during the period of the Iran nuclear deal, was able to run an expansionist foreign policy with impunity. So we are very pleased with the progress that we are making. We very much hope that we can get to an agreement, and end the sanctions, and welcome Iran into the international community. Thank you.

#### Biden sanctions solve our internal link BUT avoids the blowback of Trumpian “maximum pressure.”

**O’Toole 19** --- Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Business and Economics Program.

Brian, 9-22-2019, "Sanctions are effective—if used correctly," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctions-are-effective-if-used-correctly/

Sanctions are a critical tool of foreign policy available to US policymakers in the administration and in Congress, as they provide more leverage than is available in traditional diplomatic negotiations without the many downsides of military action. Omar cites research showing that sanctions are ineffective, but much of the literature evaluating sanctions success asks too much of the tool before deeming its use successful: sanctions cannot by themselves cause their target to surrender and certainly not overnight.

They can, however, shift the context in which the target makes decisions. Over time, sanctions can work, when combined with broader diplomatic and political efforts (e.g., sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and contributed to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s determination to ease his country’s isolation). Omar herself lauds the Global Magnitsky sanctions on human rights abuses and corrupt actors, and the boycott campaign against apartheid South Africa as sanctions successes. The former is a good tool and a noble idea that as of yet lacks demonstrated success in changing behavior, while the latter was a UN-led sanctions regime that only succeeded after almost twenty years of multilateral sanctions buoyed by a changing internal political dynamic and intense diplomatic pressure. Her dual condemnation of and praise for sanctions makes it difficult to tease out her exact argument with sanctions.

To work, as I have argued, sanctions must be used judiciously and only as part of a comprehensive and executable strategy to achieve US foreign policy and national security goals. Omar criticizes this administration for failing to articulate and stick to a comprehensive and executable policy outcome when resorting to sanctions. Instead, sanctions under Trump have become the end rather than the means, a tool used in place of a coherent and executable policy and a symbol of resolve rather than an effective means to an identifiable objective. When steely resolve is the primary driver, there is little room for granting any concession to the target, even if those concessions are good policy, like exporting food and medicine. Sloppiness in execution, another consistent policy failing of this administration, exacerbates those problems.

Omar rightly takes issue with the Trump administration’s near-sole focus on maximum pressure, or impact, of Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela sanctions without consideration for the negative impacts broad sanctions can have on a population. The Trump administration has in some cases done more harm to local populations than good in depriving bad regimes of resources, whether by imposing unnecessary, if legally supportable, terrorism sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran or re-imposing strict limits on family remittances to Cuba. Venezuela is a more complicated analysis. The aggressive sanctions deployed against the Nicolas Maduro regime certainly weakened it in the short-term, but the sanctions were so sweeping that they worsened an already critical humanitarian situation—one brought on by the regime’s mismanagement—once the initial push to oust Maduro failed and Trump turned his attention elsewhere.

The Trump administration’s failings on humanitarian aspects of sanctions, however, should not impugn the use of broad-based sanctions, nor are sanctions incompatible with human rights priorities. Congress itself passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 in part to require the facilitation of humanitarian trade in jurisdictional sanctions programs, and the George W. Bush and Obama administrations had implemented the law faithfully. The Trump administration’s policies—in this case of discouraging even legitimately authorized humanitarian trade over the mere potential for misappropriation inside Iran—is the problem, not the sanctions themselves.

Rather than throw out the tool, sanctions should be applied with more discipline and only as part of a strong diplomatic effort. In addition, there are important reforms that Congress is considering to the underlying statute for most sanctions programs, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, in the wake of perceived overuse and misuse of sanctions threats. The Government Accountability Office recently reported on the lack of internal US government assessments on the success of sanctions, a combination of lack of human capital and difficulty in assessing policy outcomes, and Congress has chafed in recent years at not being more involved in the sanctions process. It is clear that the US government should devote more resources to assessing sanctions and wargaming before their future use. Congress also should have a more active oversight role, rather than the rubber stamp process that governs renewing US sanctions programs on a yearly basis. Better understanding of success, planning for future use, and oversight of the sanctions tool will promote more effective policy and more effective sanctions in the future.

Irrespective of their current misuse and flaws in the system, sanctions still have an important role to play. In the hands of an administration that used them more carefully to avoid undue harm to local populations, they still would be a key component of combatting Iranian malign behavior, depriving Maduro of funds he uses as patronage to maintain his base of power, and targeting the human rights abuses and anti-democratic leanings of the Cuban government.

Sanctions today, though, are a tool used too often and in almost near-isolation by an administration that would prefer to govern via fiat rather than do the hard work necessary to make change on the international stage and by a Congress that seemingly can agree on little other than sanctions. Assertions that sanctions are a failure, however, ignore their utility and overstate their downsides. Better implementation and better policy are the answers, not discontinued use.

### Adv 3

#### TONS of factors structurally ensure sustainability.

Brooks& Wohlforth 16 (Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD from Yale, Former Fellow, International Security Program, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD from Yale University in International Relations, “The Once and Future Superpower”, Foreign Affairs, May/June Issue, 2016)

After two and a half decades, is the United States’ run as the world’s sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, China’s economy is on track to become the world’s biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon. But this is wishful, or fearful, thinking. Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military power as it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and established ones to fall. And China—the only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United States—also faces a more daunting challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically. Even though the United States’ economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the country’s military superiority is not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come. Lasting preeminence will help the United States ward off the greatest traditional international danger, war between the world’s major powers. And it will give Washington options for dealing with nonstate threats such as terrorism and transnational challenges such as climate change. But it will also impose burdens of leadership and force choices among competing priorities, particularly as finances grow more straitened. With great power comes great responsibility, as the saying goes, and playing its leading role successfully will require Washington to display a maturity that U.S. foreign policy has all too often lacked. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS In forecasts of China’s future power position, much has been made of the country’s pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class. But as harmful as these problems are, China’s true Achilles’ heel on the world stage is something else: its low level of technological expertise compared with the United States’. Relative to past rising powers, China has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after container of high-tech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesn’t reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what economists call “processing trade,” meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then exported afterward. And the vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more developed countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin of the expertise, China’s true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013—more than four times as much as the country in second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential articles in science and engineering—those in the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation—tells the same story, with the United States accounting for almost half of these articles, more than eight times China’s share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have received two. Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling expectations of a power shift, GDP, greatly underestimates the true economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense destruction that China is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP, even though it will reduce economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies, and so the more knowledge-based and global­ized a country’s production is, the more its GDP underestimates its economy’s true size. A new statistic developed by the UN suggests the degree to which GDP inflates China’s relative power. Called “inclusive wealth,” this measure represents economists’ most systematic effort to date to calculate a state’s wealth. As a UN report explained, it counts a country’s stock of assets in three areas: “(i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere).” Added up, the United States’ inclusive wealth comes to almost $144 trillion—4.5 times China’s $32 trillion. The true size of China’s economy relative to the United States’ may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year), whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it, “Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet.” Because inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition. But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United States is far more capable of converting its resources into military might. In the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didn’t lag far behind the United Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a serious military challenge to the dominant power. China’s relative technological backwardness today, however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own neighborhood. BARRIERS TO ENTRY The technological and economic differences between China and the United States wouldn’t matter much if all it took to gain superpower status were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally, and the bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories of systems that create this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a very long time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let alone all of them. For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base. China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such matters, and there are various obstacles in China’s way—such as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating capital—that will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing a moving target. In 2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R & D, more than 13 times as much as China’s estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close the gap. Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems, which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it takes 15 to 20 years to design and build the most advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even longer. So even if another country managed to build the scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States command of the commons, there would be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them. Even Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge. Command of the commons also requires the ability to supervise a wide range of giant defense projects. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the military-industrial complex and the “waste, fraud, and abuse” in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, and bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts do not yet have it. This kind of “learning by doing” experience resides in organizations, not in individuals. It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of espionage are not an effective shortcut for acquiring it. China’s defense industry is still in its infancy, and as the scholar Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, “Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the Chinese military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for designing and producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems.” For example, China still cannot mass-produce high-performance aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the effort, and relies instead on second-rate Russian models. In other areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea warfare. China is poorly equipped for antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack submarines that are comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s. Since then, however, the U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars and six decades of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved absolute levels of silencing. Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to actually use all these weapons. Employing them is difficult not just because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but also because they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an incredibly complicated endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together in real time. Even systems that may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for example, work best when a military has the highly trained personnel to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather, process, and act on information collected from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the commons would take any military a very long time. And since the task places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, China’s centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it. THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine, Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the United States’ own sprint from military also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today, few seriously anticipate another world war, or even another cold war, but many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries can become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies. But what is taking place now is not your grandfather’s power transition. One can debate whether China will soon reach the first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy alone won’t make China the world’s second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle, attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them. Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty. As a result, China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call it “an emerging potential superpower”: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superpower. China’s quest for superpower status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The United States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union, a superpower with the potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the Cold War pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War. Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted. A list of U.S. allies reads as a who’s who of the world’s most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price of maintaining the United States’ superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the top-end weapons they help develop. China’s only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it is worth. Given the barriers thwarting China’s path to superpower status, as well as the low incentives for trying to overcome them, the future of the international system hinges most on whether the United States continues to bear the much lower burden of sustaining what we and others have called “deep engagement,” the globe-girdling grand strategy it has followed for some 70 years. And barring some odd change of heart that results in a true abnegation of its global role (as opposed to overwrought, politicized charges sometimes made about its already having done so), Washington will be well positioned for decades to maintain the core military capabilities, alliances, and commitments that secure key regions, backstop the global economy, and foster cooperation on transnational problems. The benefits of this grand strategy can be difficult to discern, especially in light of the United States’ foreign misadventures in recent years. Fiascos such as the invasion of Iraq stand as stark reminders of the difficulty of using force to alter domestic politics abroad. But power is as much about preventing unfavorable outcomes as it is about causing favorable ones, and here Washington has done a much better job than most Americans appreciate. For a largely satisfied power leading the international system, having enough strength to deter or block challengers is in fact more valuable than having the ability to improve one’s position further on the margins. A crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy over the decades has been to prevent a much more dangerous world from emerging, and its success in this endeavor can be measured largely by the absence of outcomes common to history: important regions destabilized by severe security dilemmas, tattered alliances unable to contain breakout challengers, rapid weapons proliferation, great-power arms races, and a descent into competitive economic or military blocs. Were Washington to truly pull back from the world, more of these challenges would emerge, and transnational threats would likely loom even larger than they do today. Even if such threats did not grow, the task of addressing them would become immeasurably harder if the United States had to grapple with a much less stable global order at the same time. And as difficult as it sometimes is today for the United States to pull together coalitions to address transnational challenges, it would be even harder to do so if the country abdicated its leadership role and retreated to tend its garden, as a growing number of analysts and policymakers—and a large swath of the public—are now calling for.

#### Avoids free-riding and overstretch.

Assumes all neg authors’ args

Norloff 18 Carla Norloff 18, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Hegemony and inequality: Trump and the liberal playbook, January 2018, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/63/4762707>

LIO = Liberal International Order

The second relevant theoretical approach is grounded in Waltzian realism. According to this approach, states should pursue their national interest defined narrowly, responding to threats that affect them directly. The doctrine of restraint, also called selective engagement, sees the maintenance of long-term hegemony as exceedingly costly and futile, breeding resentment and requiring rivals to be defeated and outcompeted in a continuous effort to thwart attempts at balancing. Balancing occurs when states seek to reduce the military power of exceptionally dominant states. The tendency for states to balance power is a hard systemic law, which no state can escape, and which guarantees that a unipolar distribution of power will eventually become bipolar or multipolar. Academic advocates of selective engagement approve of Trump's call for a more restrained foreign policy while distancing themselves from his other ideas.44 They believe America's postwar grand strategy spills too much blood and treasure and carries high opportunity costs,45 and that the United States should instead pursue a strategy of offshore balancing, refocusing policies around a narrow definition of the national interest limited to preserving regional hegemony in the western hemisphere and preventing the rise of regional hegemons.46 They consider US security interests to be at stake in three areas—Europe, east Asia and the Persian Gulf—with only east Asia requiring significant onshore engagement.47 Broadly agreeing with Trump, they say allies have to learn how to fend for themselves, and that the US should introduce uncertainty about forthcoming military support.48 In order to improve the plight of fellow Americans, the United States should reorientate public policy around domestic goals, giving up some international goals. For proponents of these arguments, America's international commitments clash with its domestic commitments.¶ Three flawed assumptions¶ Three features of the LIO emerge as problematic from these two perspectives. First, other countries free-ride on US political and economic leadership. Second, there are fundamental trade-offs between America's military and economic capability: US security commitments are responsible for US economic decline. Third, there are fundamental trade-offs between America's international and domestic posture. On the basis of this analysis, to promote America's national interest, the grand strategy supporting the LIO should be replaced with strategic restraint; the US should stop bearing a disproportionate share of the costs associated with solving global problems and let others take care of themselves, restricting US involvement to protecting vital security interests, defending the homeland and preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon.¶ However, the three assumptions underlying this analysis, and criticisms of the LIO, mischaracterize America's liberal dilemma. The first questionable assumption is that international cooperation resembles a public goods problem whereby the US, as the largest state, bears disproportionate costs while free-riding allies reap disproportionate benefits. Second, the negative repercussions of US security commitments for US economic strength are rarely balanced against the full benefits of US security commitments to the United States itself. Third, the assumption that there is an international–domestic trade-off and that whatever resources have been ‘squandered’ on international engagement can readily be diverted to the pursuit of productive, welfare-enhancing, domestic goals grossly understates both US benefits from the LIO and the risks attached to dismantling ‘selected’ parts of the LIO.49¶ When international cooperation is cast as a public goods dilemma, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the hegemon is in a disadvantageous position. But the public goods analogy does not adequately capture the essence of international cooperation, because few issues are characterized by the properties that define public goods—non-rivalry and non-exclusion.50 Rather, the hegemon provides a mix of public and private goods, or imperfect public goods.51 Despite these recognized flaws, and much scholarship to the contrary, the public goods version of HST remains influential.¶ Rejecting the ‘exploited hegemon’ version of HST, several scholars point to the ways in which the hegemon is positionally primed to benefit disproportionately from underwriting the LIO.52 They argue that public goods provision offers more opportunities than constraints, and, while they recognize that free-riding is a possible threat to the hegemon's long-term rule,53 they emphasize the ways in which the hegemon can use its dominance to internalize positive externalities and externalize negative externalities.54 As long as the hegemon is not providing pure public goods, the distribution of gains will not necessarily favour other states. And as long as the distribution of gains does not favour other states, providing an open economy does not necessarily compromise the hegemon's security interests or its position of dominance.55¶ The founders of HST, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner, believed that hegemonic orders were particularly robust during the hegemon's ascendancy, and therefore worried greatly about the future of US hegemony and the LIO as the US underwent relative decline in the 1970s and 1980s.¶ Contemporary scholars, on the other hand, emphasize the cyclical property of postwar hegemony, seeing the United States as capable of reversing phases of decline by using different levers of power to avoid absolute decline.56 They see different forms of power interacting favourably for the hegemon, with financial dominance reinforcing commercial dominance, commercial dominance facilitating financial dominance, and security dominance boosting both commercial and financial dominance.57¶ Since the 1980s, IR scholars have tended to view the United States as militarily strong yet economically weak, a development hastened with the rise of China and other emerging economies in the third millennium.58 But even today, after many rounds of decline (and ascent), the United States has no peer competitor either militarily or economically. Commercially robust but financially vulnerable, China ranks as the world's third largest military power after Russia and the United States. While Russia's military continues to be the US military's principal rival, it is not as potent as it was under the Soviet Union. And while Russia's economy is not as debilitated as it was under the Soviet Union, it continues to be frail. Japan and Germany, two of America's principal allies, are economically strong, but militarily weak.¶ As figures 1 and 2 reveal, the United States has sustained its economic lead throughout the postwar era, boasting the world's first economy with an unrivalled capacity for economic output, an impressive commercial record and an unsurpassed financial position. US economic performance is grossly underrated. First, as shown in figure 1, which displays US GDP, trade and company size, US GDP is still roughly a quarter of global GDP (just below the dotted 25 per cent line). Declinists take the considerable fall in America's postwar share of global GDP as a sign of weakness. But it is unrealistic to think that the United States would continue to command a third of global GDP as it did immediately after the Second World War—particularly since much of the observed decline was the result of deliberate efforts by the United States to bolster its allies in western Europe and east Asia through the Marshall Plan and other initiatives.59 What is rather remarkable is that, even with the rise of non-allies such as China, America's share of world GDP has stabilized around a quarter and continues to be nearly twice as large as China's share. Second, as also shown in figure 1, US commercial capability aggregated into its combined share of world exports and imports—trade—is slightly higher than China's. But exports and imports are not the best way to measure commercial prowess, because the contemporary web of production globalizes manufacturing. Owing to global supply chains, imported final goods include intermediate inputs and technology produced and developed in the United States that do not show up as exports but nonetheless provide American jobs and income. And when exporting final goods, US firms depend on low trade barriers to import low-cost intermediate inputs. The United States' ability to spread production worldwide has been accompanied by long-term rising trends in numbers of foreign affiliates, value added and net income, generating significant profits for the United States.60 As shown in figure 1, the aggregate value of US companies far exceeds that of any other country.¶ Figure 1:¶ Great Power production and commercial capability, 2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Great Power production and commercial capability, 2016¶ Figure 2:¶ Great Power financial and military capability, 2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Great Power financial and military capability, 2016¶ Third, few assessments compare the relative financial capabilities of Great Powers. Studies often favour narrow definitions of financial power over broader assessments. Some focus on the relative size of US financial markets, some on financial networks, some on reserve currency issuance, but few provide an aggregate picture.61 These incomplete portrayals lead to gross underestimation of US financial power.62 As shown in figure 2, US financial markets account for slightly more than a quarter of the global total, and US reserve currency provision far surpasses that of any other state or states, and that of the eurozone.¶ Fourth, as also demonstrated in figure 2, the United States is the world's most formidable military power, its capabilities far exceeding those of any other nation. Taking into account front-line capabilities on the ground, on the sea and in the air, as well as the capacity for reconnaissance, strategic transport and communication to project power, the United States has no rival.63¶ The United States' multidimensional power base clearly puts it in a class above rival powers. Yet its privileged position in the international system is even greater than what these snapshot barometers indicate, because significant synergies exist between the various dimensions.64¶ US security dominance supports US commercial and monetary dominance, and its commercial and monetary dominance are mutually supportive. First, by providing security guarantees, stabilizing hot-spots and securing sea lanes, the United States ensures that international trade and finance can occur without disruption. This is of great value to the United States itself because, as the world's single largest economy, it has a high stake in guaranteeing stable economic relations. Second, propping up the financial realm, America's vast security network provides incentives for allies to continue supporting the dollar's role as the number one global currency.65 Third, the dollar's global role gives the United States the capacity to borrow at exceptionally low rates, providing it with extraordinary macroeconomic flexibility to ease balance of payments adjustments, particularly trade adjustments.66 Fourth, America's commercial position bolsters the dollar's global role by facilitating trade adjustment as governments, particularly in emerging markets, continue to finance US deficits by holding dollar assets in the hope of gaining continued access to US markets.67¶ ‘America first’ promises to touch all of these areas, overhauling longstanding US policies in the security, commercial and monetary spheres. But its real menace lies in its potential for sparking drastic changes by overturning policies in just one sphere. If the United States ceases to defend allies, and reduces its commitment to secure the international environment, cross-border trade and investment will operate in a more uncertain setting. While it is impossible to predict which policy is most likely to unleash an unfavourable chain of events, a hypothetical example can be used to illustrate the presumptive cascade. If we assume the United States follows through with significant commercial retreat, then we should expect monetary consequences. With the United States ceasing to account for a significant portion of international trade, official and private investors will increasingly hold alternative currencies for reserves and payment. If the diversification out of dollars is substantial, the dollar could gradually lose its centrality in the monetary order, complicating the adjustment of US trade imbalances. Balance of payments difficulties could very well ricochet back in the monetary sphere, with a crisis of confidence over trade imbalances triggering a run on the dollar. With the dollar under pressure, its international role for governments and private actors could come into question. If the dollar is no longer widely used for reserves and payments, US financial markets will lose importance relative to other financial markets. A diminished role for US financial markets implies lower demand for US assets, raising US borrowing costs. And the loss of US borrowing privileges will have security ramifications, since financing US military power will become more expensive.68 With these developments, America's slippage in the ranks of Great Powers will be assured.¶ The real liberal dilemma¶ President Trump misidentifies the nature of the redistribution problem confronting America, misinterpreting unequal internal redistribution as unequal external redistribution. The liberal dilemma is not that the LIO distributes gains unfavourably to the United States, but that not everyone in the United States wins because US domestic policies have not kept pace with global economic integration. Economic globalization can deepen domestic inequality. Import competition causes some sectors to shrink, and workers employed in contracting sectors may not be fully absorbed in expanding sectors. Neo-classical trade theory predicts that economic activity will increase in the sector using the country's abundant factor since its reward will increase relative to that of the scarce factor.69 In the case of an advanced capital-abundant country such as the United States, this means that the reward to capital will increase relative to labour. Financial globalization has even more acute effects on the distribution of income, further raising the reward to capital relative to labour.70 However, since suspending international economic exchange reduces national welfare gains, countries are better off expanding the pie, and compensating losers with the higher gains available from economic globalization. The United States needs to bring back ‘embedded liberalism’ to redistribute benefits from openness through greater safeguards and labour adjustment programmes, including trade adjustment, so that the LIO can begin to work for all Americans.71¶ Dissatisfaction with the international distribution of income is, however, insufficient to explain the backlash against globalization. President Trump correctly identified the liberal dilemma inside the United States as the clash between liberal ideals and the preservation of a racial hierarchy which put ‘white America first’—a contradiction which has resulted in a racial and educational divide at the ballot box.72 To fully understand waning American support for the LIO, one must look to the unravelling of America's liberal identity as a principal cause of the less secure domestic foundations of the LIO. Some elements of America's liberal identity, such as ‘political democracy, constitutional government, individual rights [and] private property based economic systems’, remain intact. However, other elements, such as ‘toleration of diversity in non-civic areas of ethnicity and religion’ are in jeopardy.73 In fomenting an ‘us and them’ division between Americans and foreigners alleged to be exploiting the United States, and by stoking an internal division between Americans of different ethnicities and faiths, Trump unveiled an international and domestic hierarchy that some thought no longer existed. How did these factors intermingle with income inequality in the 2016 US elections?¶ The extent of inequality in the United States¶ Income inequality in the United States has increased since the late 1960s. By 2015, the top 5 per cent earned 28 times as much, and the top 20 per cent 16 times as much, as the lowest 20 per cent of Americans. This share has risen over time irrespective of the incumbent president's party affiliation, as shown in figure 3, which traces this development back to the late 1970s. Below I use mean income data from the US Census Bureau to discern the effect of income inequality on different ethnic groups. Ideally, this analysis would be performed using median income data, but this is not consistently available across all measures of interest.74¶ Figure 3:¶ Income inequality between the top and bottom income earners in the United States, 1978–2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income inequality between the top and bottom income earners in the United States, 1978–2016¶ Concerns about income may have loomed large in the 2016 presidential elections. It could be, for instance, that by 2016 income inequality in the United States had reached a tipping point, a level that Americans were no longer prepared to tolerate. The only vote margin—that is, the difference in percentage of votes between Republicans and Democrats—that was consistently and substantially different from those in the 2008 and 2012 elections was the margin for those earning less than US$50,000 a year. Although this group—arguably the most affected by the widening income gap—still supported the Democratic candidate overall (though to a lesser extent than in the two previous elections), the margin between the Democratic and Republican votes narrowed to 12 points from 22 points in 2008 and 2012. The margins for higher-income groups were not as wide, nor were they significantly different from the levels recorded in the 2008 and 2012 elections. In an anti-establishment election, factors other than income, such as Clinton's ‘elitism’, might have been a liability. But the unfavourable opinion of Clinton (81 per cent) was less strong among those who voted for Trump than disapproval of former President Obama (89 per cent).75 It is, however, possible that dissatisfaction with Clinton was greater within the group earning under US$50,000.¶ While income did matter in the 2016 election, it was not, on its own, the most important predictor of the outcome. As shown in figures 4 and 5, income did play a role, but primarily as it intersected with other factors, particularly education and colour.76 In the following paragraphs I consider the income growth of non-college-educated whites relative to college-educated whites; and the absolute income (including income growth) of non-college-educated whites relative to the overall non-college-educated population.¶ Figure 4:¶ Income growth among US citizens with education below college degree level, 1998–2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income growth among US citizens with education below college degree level, 1998–2016¶ Figure 5:¶ Income growth among US citizens with education above college degree level, 1998–2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income growth among US citizens with education above college degree level, 1998–2016¶ In 2016, white voters without a college degree voted for Trump (66 per cent) with much higher percentages than in 2012 (61 per cent) and 2008 (58 per cent), and with much higher margins (see figure 4). But white voters without a college degree (both those with and those without a high school diploma) supported Trump despite experiencing greater income growth during the full span of Obama's presidency than any other white group defined by educational level. Their income expansion was also stronger than any other education group during Obama's second term (2012–2016). However, during Obama's first term (2008–2012), their income did not grow as fast as that of white Americans with advanced degrees, although they did better than those with an associate (i.e. two-year college) degree or bachelor's degree. Despite stronger income development than college-educated income earners, whites without a college degree voted for Trump with a 37-point margin, whereas whites with a college degree favoured Trump with only a 3-point margin. Although these numbers suggest that something other than income explains Trump's victory, it could still be that the higher margins for white voters without college degrees reflect discontent with low real incomes.¶ If low real incomes explain Trump's support among white voters without college degrees, we should find general support for Trump among voters with low real incomes. However, since 1998 the mean income of whites without college degrees has always been higher than the mean income of all those without college degrees. If their income remained higher, was their income growth slower? During the full length of Obama's presidency, and during his first term, whites without a college degree experienced higher growth than all income earners without a college degree. Only during Obama's second term did the mean income of whites without a college degree underperform the income of all earners without a college degree. The growth differential between the two groups during this period,77 however, is quite small, for both those with and those without a high school diploma: the mean income of workers without a high school diploma increased by 13.41 per cent, compared to 12.99 per cent growth for whites without a high school diploma. The mean income of all workers with a high school diploma increased by 5.73 per cent; of whites with a high-school diploma, by 5.60 per cent. It is noteworthy that during Obama's second term the overall mean income of all earners with a college degree increased less than for whites with a college degree. The biggest difference was for whites with an advanced degree, who earned US$1,394 a year less than the mean income of all recipients of advanced degrees. Yet despite slower income growth, white college graduates were disinclined to vote Republican in the 2016 elections (see figure 5).¶ If dissatisfaction with income played a role in explaining why white voters without a college degree endorsed Trump, the only evidence for it is the relatively lower income growth of white earners without college degrees compared to all earners without college degrees between 2012 and 2015. Disaggregating the income differential for non-college-educated whites, those without a high-school diploma experienced 0.43 per cent lower income growth, and those with a diploma 0.13 per cent lower income growth, than all non-college-educated earners within the corresponding educational group. It is highly unlikely that these small percentage differences explain why whites without a college degree favoured Trump with a 37-point margin whereas all earners without a college degree favoured Trump with only a 7-point margin.¶ If income mattered only in conjunction with education and colour in the 2016 elections, income might have been more decisive in distressed regions. One of the biggest surprises in the 2016 presidential election was how the Democrats lost the ‘blue wall’ states in the ‘Rust Belt’—Pennsylvania in the north-east; Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan and Ohio in the mid-west. The Democrats also lost Florida in the south, a traditionally Republican state, which Obama won in 2008 and 2012.¶ Declining employment and income are said to have contributed to support for Trump in conventionally Democratic states. But there are several problems with this explanation. While the decline in the mid-west is real, it has been in the making for a very long time. During the Obama years, specifically between 2008 and 2016, income in the mid-west rose more sharply than in all other regions. During Obama's second term, both white and overall income growth was stronger in the mid-west than in any other region. Yet the Republican vote exceeded the Democratic vote in the mid-west by the second-highest margin of any region (see figure 6). Moreover, during the same period, income growth for whites was higher than for all ethnic groups combined; and yet whites in the mid-west voted Republican by a margin of 20 points, compared to a margin of 5 points for the region overall. However, during Obama's second term, white income growth in the mid-west was lower than in all other regions except for the west. Overall income growth was worse in the mid-west than in all other regions. Yet the white margin in favour of Trump was stronger in the mid-west (20 points) than in the west (5 points), and the overall margin in favour of Trump in the mid-west (5 points) was considerably lower than for whites in the mid-west (20 points).¶ Figure 6:¶ Income growth by region and race, 1998–2015¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income growth by region and race, 1998–2015¶ Given the higher proportion of whites in the mid-west (76 per cent) than nationally (61 per cent), and the higher number of voters in the region aged over 25 years without a college degree (71 per cent) than nationally (55 per cent),78 it is likely that factors of education, colour and income combine to explain the level of support for Trump in 2016.¶ In the 2016 election, racial polarization, as measured by the difference between white and non-white preferences for Trump, was highest in the south, second to highest in the mid-west and north-east, and lowest in the west. These cleavages were most apparent in the south and mid-west. White voters were aligned with Trump in the south (67 per cent) and the mid-west (57 per cent), non-white voters with Clinton in the south (77 per cent) and mid-west (75 per cent).¶ Racially differentiated voting patterns do not necessarily mean that voting is racially motivated. It could be that whites are generally more conservative on a range of issues and that their views were therefore better aligned with the policies espoused by the Republican than the Democratic candidate. Yet that would not explain why so many white college-educated voters fled the Republican presidential nominee in 2016 (see figure 5). Rather, there exists some evidence that racist attitudes encouraged a portion of the white electorate to align with Trump. For example, 80 per cent of white evangelical Christians supported Trump.79 Their vote is important because although they account for a lower share of the population today (17 per cent) than in 2008 (21 per cent), they still account for 26 per cent of the vote because a lot of them turn out to vote.80 Their high proportion of the vote suggests that racism might have been a relevant issue. In the months before the elections, a non-partisan study by the American Values Atlas revealed that white evangelicals were less likely to perceive discrimination against blacks, with only 36 per cent saying blacks were discriminated against ‘a lot’, compared to the national average of 57 per cent.81¶ Trump and the liberal playbook¶ In 2016, socio-cultural fissures within the United States played a critical role in the election of the presidential candidate most disparaging of the LIO. Trump's call to put America ‘first’ internationally, and white Christians ‘first’ domestically, resonated with non-college-educated white voters who saw their historic privileges fading. Not all grievances were racially motivated; certainly, some poorer non-college-educated whites compared their present situation unfavourably with the rosier circumstances of their families' past.82¶ The relationship between education and race was first noted over seven decades ago. Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 book An American dilemma was famously cited in the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and helped desegregate education in the United States by demonstrating that education could not be separate but equal for blacks.83 Myrdal went further, calling for an ‘educational offensive against racial intolerance’ and the forging of an ‘American creed’, a civic culture with equal rights for all Americans, to overcome the contradiction between American liberal ideals and the reality of racial discrimination.84¶ Since then, great progress has been made. Blacks, and other minorities, in the United States are equal before the law and have equal political rights, and greater social and economic opportunities, than before. Education has no doubt played a significant role in reducing explicit racist behaviour or individual racism, that is, ‘overt acts by individuals, which cause death, injury or the violent destruction of property’.85 But discrimination is a problem beyond what most people would recognize as specific instances of racist behaviour. Institutional racism is a ‘less overt, far more subtle, less identifiable’ form of racism, which ‘originates in the operation of established and respected forces in society’.86 The concept of white privilege is the flip side of institutional racism and refers to the unearned benefits enjoyed as a result of being white.87 The concept is not intended to mean that every white person is ‘privileged’ or that no other form of privilege exists. It is intended to expose the existence of an implicit racial hierarchy in society and the political, economic and legal inequality which it reproduces.88 Attempts to attenuate white privilege are met with suspicion and opposition by those who benefit from it. For example, today a majority of white Americans (55 per cent) believe they are discriminated against, and nearly half of them (26 per cent) attribute this to US ‘laws and government policies’.89 Whites who believe they face institutional racism are unlikely to see a difference between policies designed to reduce unmerited privileges and policies that reduce merited privileges. They are also unlikely to appreciate how restrictive the scope for affirmative action is. For example, in the case of university admissions policies, quotas have been unconstitutional since the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Many states even forbid the use of race in admissions procedures. Where states do permit the use of race, it may be used only as one criterion in promoting diversity, and only if all other methods fail, as laid down in the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Fisher v. University of Texas.¶ The political scientist and public intellectual Walter Russell Mead has explained the 2016 election outcome as a ‘Jacksonian revolt’ in which many ‘white Americans find themselves in a society that talks constantly about the importance of identity, that values ethnic authenticity, that offers economic benefits and social advantages based on identity—for everybody but them’.90 Another political scientist, Mark Lilla, proposes an end to identity politics as a way to secure broader support for liberal policies.91 I agree with Mead that identity politics cannot be unilateral, and I agree with Lilla that the American habit of categorizing individuals according to essentialist criteria is contrary to liberal principles. But I am not sure either of them would agree that there has been an essentialist identity politics in the United States, going back at least to the eighteenth century, constructed around the primacy of a white American identity of European Christian descent. Reactions against this unspoken identity politics lay beneath claims of institutional racism long before Trump gave voice to a ‘white America first’ policy at home.¶ College-educated white Americans are more likely to recognize the advantages attached to being white (47 per cent) than white Americans without college degrees (17 per cent).92 A possible reason for this is that higher education fosters liberal attitudes, and provides exposure to different ethnic groups, limiting blatant forms of racism.93 But even though college-educated whites are less inclined to vote for their privilege, and more prepared to see their privilege, there is plenty of room in the liberal playbook for race-based discrimination. There's a playbook in force that liberals are supposed to follow. The playbook prescribes responses to different forms of racism, and these responses tend to be outraged responses. When no colleague or friend is threatened by charges of racism, the playbook works. But the playbook can also be a trap leading to bad decisions because discriminatory practices often implicate someone's colleague, friend, family or wider community. The trap is especially pernicious in higher education, where people tend to overestimate their liberal inclinations, and where opportunities, support and intellectual attribution are largely network-based.94 It is therefore unsurprising that a higher percentage of college-educated blacks (55 per cent) say they have been disadvantaged by their race than non-college-educated blacks (29 per cent). An even higher percentage of all blacks (81 per cent) who at some point attended college say they were treated differently because of their race: perhaps an overlooked factor in the reasons why blacks are less likely to finish college.95¶ In addition to the different experiences and beliefs about race to which education gives rise, a partisan divide exists, with Republicans (43 per cent) more likely than Democrats (27 per cent) to say whites, rather than blacks, experience a lot of discrimination.96 Only 37 per cent of Republicans (against 76 per cent of Democrats) say racism is a problem.97 Attitudes towards blacks also extend to other groups. From the 2016 exit polls, we know that Trump voters were more likely to support a wall along the Mexican border (85 per cent) than Clinton voters (10 per cent), to support deportation of illegal immigrants (83 per cent vs 14 per cent) and view immigration as the most pressing problem for the country (64 per cent vs 33 per cent).98¶ Overall, the evidence presented in this article suggests not only that education and race were strong predictors of the 2016 presidential vote, but that racism was a contributing factor.¶ Summary and conclusion¶ Trump did not create angst about America's dominant position in the world, or about white America's dominant position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, but he tapped into these two currents more unabashedly than any other presidential candidate in postwar history. This article deconstructs ‘America first’ into two components, an international component and a domestic component, which share common symptoms (lost greatness) and common remedies (redistribution).¶ In the first two sections of this article, I discussed the international component, and how ‘America first’ threatens to undermine the LIO. I showed how ‘America first’ reflects concerns about American decline and American overextension in three areas: the security, trade and monetary spheres. A common theme in this narrative is how the United States is being exploited by other countries, and how disengaging from the LIO presents a better path forward. In the security area, the world should no longer count on the US to act as global policeman or to tolerate unfair burden-sharing within security alliances. In trade, the US will no longer stand by as other countries free-ride on America's openness. In the monetary realm, the dollar's global role is not as good as gold. While Trump's views on the LIO are quite idiosyncratic, and have yet to be fully implemented, declinists and proponents of retrenchment share certain aspects of this outlook.¶ In opposition to this perspective, I have provided broad-based metrics demonstrating that the United States remains by a long way the leading state in the world today, and argued that it would be a lot worse off under alternatives to the LIO than it has been in the postwar era and is today. A counterfactual setting, where the United States does not provide international security, would be a more uncertain and more economically fragile one, with more limited commerce and investment. A United States of America in which the commercial and financial playing field, including the dollar's role, no longer spans the globe, but is domestically confined, will reduce US prosperity and geopolitical reach. Yet there is a growing sense, correctly identified by President Trump, that America's global engagement is not benefiting all Americans.

#### Any transition away would cause extinction --- outweighs any marginal benefits.

Keck 14 (Zachary Keck, Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, 1-24, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/)

Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world.¶ Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states.¶ We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead.¶ All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals.¶ But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others.¶ A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.¶ The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.

**Even if multipolarity is the result of hegemonic decline, it causes major power conflicts and extinction.**

**Blagden 15**—PhD at the University of Oxford, the Adrian Research Fellow in International Politics at Darwin College, and a Research Associate with the Centre for Rising Powers in the Department of Politics and International Studies, both at the University of Cambridge, [David, “Global multipolarity, European security and implications for UK grand strategy: back to the future, once again” International Affairs 91: 2, 2015, p. 340-342]

\*\*\*SLOC = Sea Lane of Communication

Third, a multipolar world of elevated Great Power security competition **is likely to be one with considerable potential for military crises**, which could **embroil European states**—either inadvertently, or because their vital interests are affected. Whereas under unipolarity, the **U**nited **S**tates could pacify **all potential major power conflicts** by threatening to defeat one or—if necessary—both sides, that is **no longer the case under multipolarity**. Indeed, the difficulty in predicting future international conflict suggests that European grand strategy should at least partially hedge against embroilment in such as yet unforeseen emergencies. There is considerable potential for military crises **on the borders of NATO**, as the events of 2008 and 2014 demonstrate, and any such crisis on Europe’s borders will be a pressing security concern for European states. Likewise, the Middle East is likely to remain a focal point of security competition and an arena of potential conflict **embroiling European states**, given its proximity to the European periphery, its economic importance to Europe, China and India, continuing civil wars in Syria and Iraq, the strength of regional revolutionary movements such as Islamic State/ ISIS, and the presence of several militarily capable regional powers with divergent interests, such as Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Egypt. **There is also the risk of involvement in military crises further afield**, particularly where key commercial or strategic interests are at stake. For example, threats to UK interests in the South Atlantic **will increase as Latin American development proceeds**, especially if the seabed around the Falkland Islands contains large-scale mineral deposits, and France could face similar challenges in Africa. Of course, this article cannot hope, and does not aim, to laundry-list all potential future conflict scenarios; **the key point is that in a world of general Great Power tension, the likelihood of serious militarized crises will increase.** The fourth reason why a multipolar global environment may have an impact on the European strategic environment is that it may increase incentives to **acquire nuclear weapons**—or at least, not to give them up. There are excellent reasons to suppose that nuclear weapons favour defence and make interstate conflict between possessors less likely.41 However, the likelihood of accidental, inadvertent or miscalculated nuclear use **rises with the number of nuclear powers**, particularly when that number includes states with weak administrative capacity and political systems with the potential to be dominated by non-representative militarist or radical factions.42 **Multipolar Great Power competition** will make many states feel vulnerable, and the best deterrent against coercion by those strong in conventional weapons is a nuclear arsenal. Likewise, in such a world, states are more likely to feel that they require a potent means of coercion to promote their interests. That being the case, a grand multilateral disarmament bargain is unlikely, and non-proliferation efforts may well continue to struggle in the coming years, with potentially negative consequences for the European security environment. Of course, it can be argued that there has been less nuclear proliferation than many analysts predicted in the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, however, Ukraine has recently joined a list of countries, including Libya and Iraq, whose leaders presumably regretted surrendering the deterrent power of a weapons of mass destruction programme under the urgings of the major power(s) that subsequently attacked them. If America’s ability to pacify the globe does wane, moreover, plenty of nuclear-capable states under the US nuclear umbrella that currently choose not to develop nuclear weapons will feel compelled to revisit that choice (South Korea and Japan being obvious candidates). The fifth and final reason why a multipolar international system could threaten the European strategic environment connects to the point made above about potential embroilment in military crises elsewhere in the world. This is the potential for such crises to have negative impacts upon European states’ SLOCs and associated critical supply chains (for food, raw materials, energy, industrial inputs and so forth). Europe relies on **uninterrupted flows of imports and exports**, mainly via the sea, for economic well-being and strategic viability. European energy supplies rely heavily on the Middle East and Russia—both potential sources of diplomatic and strategic tension. The Indian Ocean, the Persian and Arabian Gulfs, and the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, meanwhile, are all crucial to European seagoing commerce **as well as potential arenas of maritime Great Power contestation**. Yet European states’ maritime capability to provide independent (non-US) influence over such SLOCs has been hollowed out **by progressive waves of naval cuts**. Meanwhile, the South Atlantic will remain an important theatre for the United Kingdom while London sustains its current resolve to retain possession of the Falklands, and all west European states should consider Russia’s increasing maritime assertiveness in the north-east Atlantic—the single most crucial SLOC for European powers, both commercially and strategically.

#### Unipolarity is sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power war.

Brands 15—Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke, PhD in History from Yale, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense [Hal, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2015 38:2 pp. 7–28]

The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies.43 During the Cold War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor—think Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above, it could lead countries like Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals.”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.

#### Data proves hegemony solves prolif.

Gibbons 16 (Rebecca Davis Gibbons, PhD Government, Georgetown, MA International Security Studies, Georgetown, “AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND THE POLITICS OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME,” 2016, <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1041833/Gibbons_georgetown_0076D_13333.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION The 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widespread arms control treaty in history. The non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT have committed to forgo possession of the most powerful weapon on the planet. And yet, many of these states have been slow to support additional treaties, agreements, and activities that also promote the goal of nuclear nonproliferation. For example, some states, such as Canada, Jordan, Japan, Ireland, and New Zealand, have signed on to every new regime agreement and activity, most within a relatively short amount of time. Others, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, acceded to the NPT but have been unwilling to sign, ratify, or join many additional regime agreements and activities. Most NPT states fall somewhere in between. The variation in NPT states’ commitment to elements of the larger nuclear nonproliferation regime raises a question: if states have ratified the NPT, the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, what explains variation in states’ commitment to other aspects of the regime? In other words, why are some NPT states more committed to the nuclear nonproliferation regime than others? Employing a theory based on the leadership of the hegemon, this project argues NPT members most favorable to the hegemon’s global leadership are most likely to commit, and commit more quickly, to additional elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime after minimal diplomatic outreach. Less favorable states are less likely to support new nonproliferation initiatives, and when they do, will join more slowly. Moreover, states less favorable to hegemonic leadership will often require threats or inducements from the hegemon in order to commit. This theory is based on the premise that the most powerful states have a strategic interest in nuclear nonproliferation.1 Nuclear weapons in the possession of other states threaten these powers in a number of ways: limiting power-projection capabilities, threatening areas of strategic interest, and menacing domestic and allied populations. Because the hegemon has the greatest strategic interest in preventing additional nuclear weapons states, it pursues nonproliferation globally. As a result, other states associate nonproliferation with the hegemon and therefore their commitment to the nonproliferation regime reflects their favorability to the hegemon’s global leadership. In the nuclear age, the United States has been this hegemonic power. Because of its strategic concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons, the United States has been the primary catalyst in developing the nonproliferation regime. Of all states, the United States has expended the greatest amount of time and resources in garnering regime commitments to reduce the number of additional nuclear weapons states and to protect fissile material from getting into the hands of dangerous actors. This argument stands in contrast to recent scholarship arguing that international institutional commitments are heavily shaped by domestic political institutions.2 To provide a small sampling of this literature, scholars find differences in regime type explain variation in advocacy surrounding early European human rights treaties,3 ascension to the International Criminal Court,4 and the propensity to enter preferential trading arrangements.5 Other scholars find democratization leads states to enter all types of international organizations because joining allows leaders to credibly commit to democratic reforms.6 In contrast to the preponderance of research connecting regime type and other domestic level variables to treaty and agreement ascension, this project instead points to the importance of international factors, specifically the role of the hegemon, in explaining variation in nonproliferation regime participation. This conclusion thus suggests that commitment to security institutions may be explained by different mechanisms than those driving commitment to other types of multilateral institutions. Scholars have a limited understanding of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and why states agree to participate in its many activities and agreements.7 In a recent review of the nonproliferation literature, Scott D. Sagan argues, “We know very little about why different governments joined the NPT and how their interests and interpretations have shaped the patterns of their compliance behavior.”8 Similarly, William C. Potter, in an article assessing causes of nuclear restraint, argues that it is challenging to make predictions about the future of nonproliferation because of “the underdeveloped state of research on foreign policy forecasting in general and nuclear decision-making in particular.”9 Employing both large-N quantitative analysis and detailed case studies, I conduct an analysis on the determinants and mechanisms of states’ commitment to the regime. To preview the findings, this project’s quantitative analysis contends that favorability toward the U.S.-led order has a statistically and substantively significant effect on nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment. Favorability to U.S. global leadership is proxied using UN General Assembly voting data, a commonly used indicator for such preferences. These findings suggest that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is best considered a hegemonic order. Contrary to recent literature on international agreements, I do not find support for the idea that domestic political variables are an important driver of nonproliferation commitments. I also find little support that resisting additional commitments is related to hedging behavior born from external security threats. The qualitative case studies trace the decision-making of three key states within the nuclear nonproliferation regime—Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt—surrounding three elements of the regime: ratification of the NPT, the 1995 extension of the NPT, and conclusion of the 1997 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol Safeguards agreement. Together the quantitative and qualitative findings indicate strong support for a theory of commitment based on hegemonic leadership. This project makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. Empirically, using a newly developed dataset, it finds that variation in commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime is best explained by variation in states’ favorability toward the hegemon’s global leadership. The case study research, based on archival materials and over 35 interviews with current and former diplomats, provides new information about the U.S. role in promoting nuclear nonproliferation. Theoretically, the findings in this project indicate that the nuclear nonproliferation regime should be conceptualized as a hegemonic order, in which the most powerful state shapes the decision-making of all other states. This conclusion is significant for the future of nonproliferation efforts as it suggests that the order may not continue without a superpower backer, or “after hegemony.”10

#### Even if we’re wrong about that --- no impact to prolif.

Mueller 16 (John Mueller, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies; Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 6/5/16, “Embracing Threatlessness: US Military Spending, Newt Gingrich, and the Costa Rica Option,” <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/CNArestraintCato16.pdf>)

For decades there has been almost wall-to-wall alarm about the dangers supposedly inherent in nuclear proliferation. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been far slower than has been commonly predicted over the decades primarily because the weapons do not generally convey much advantage to their possessor. And, more importantly, the effect of the proliferation that has taken place has been substantially benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats.67 The holds even for the proliferation of the weapons to large, important countries run by unchallenged monsters who at the time they acquired the bombs were certifiably deranged: Josef Stalin who in 1949 was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong who in 1964 had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that had resulted in artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.68 Despite this experience, an aversion to nuclear proliferation continues to impel alarmed concern, and it was a chief motivator of the Iraq War which essentially was a militarized antiproliferation effort. The war proved to be a necessary cause of the deaths of more people than were inflicted at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.69 The subsequent and consequent Iraq syndrome strongly suggests there will be little incentive to apply military force to prevent, or to deal with, further putative proliferation. Thus, despite nearly continuous concern—even at times hysteria—about nuclear developments in North Korea and Iran, proposals to use military force (particularly boots on the ground) to deal with these developments have been persistently undercut. The invasion of Iraq presumably did prevent that country from going nuclear—assuming it ever would have been able to put together the effort.70 However, it scarcely seems likely that there will be much sympathy for repeating that disastrous experience. Thus, maintaining huge forces-in-being to deal with the proliferation problem scarcely seems sensible, even though almost everybody still considers proliferation to be major security concern. What seems to be required in these cases, as generally with the devils du jour of the Cold War era, is judicious, watchful, and wary patience.

#### There is no right option in the context of AI – the only certainty we have is Russian and Chinese control of AI would be far worse

Lowther and McGiffin 19 – Dr. Adam Lowther is Director of Research and Education at the Louisiana Tech Research Institute (LTRI) where he teaches deterrence strategy, NC3 History, and Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in several nuclear command, control, and communication courses for the U.S. Air Force. Curtis McGiffin is Associate Dean, School of Strategic Force Studies, at the Air Force Institute of Technology.

Adam Lowther and Curtis McGiffin, August 16 2019, “AMERICA NEEDS A “DEAD HAND”,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/america-needs-a-dead-hand/

However, artificial intelligence is no panacea. Its [failures are numerous](https://medium.com/syncedreview/2018-in-review-10-ai-failures-c18faadf5983). And the fact that there is profound concern by well-respected experts in the field that science fiction may become reality, because artificial intelligence designers cannot control their creation, should not be dismissed. For the United States, every option presents significant risk and uncertainty. Reality, however, is progressing to a point where the United States must address the challenge we outlined above. Russia and China are not constrained by the same moral dilemmas that keep Americans awake at night. Rather, they are focused on creating strategic advantage for their countries.

#### 0 scenario for pre-delegated launch authority

Boulanin 19 – senior researcher at SIPRI, where his work focuses on the challenges posed by the advances of autonomy in weapon systems and the military applications of AI more broadly.

Vincent Boulanin, May 2019, “THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK,” SIPRI, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipri1905-ai-strategic-stability-nuclear-risk.pdf

For the near future, it is hard to see a situation in which humans explicitly delegate decisions to launch nuclear forces to machines—although the Soviet experience in the 1980s indicates that the possibility of movement in that direction should not be discounted. For all of the extended capabilities that AI-enabled systems may offer nuclear early warning and command and control, nuclear policymakers and operators need to keep at the forefront of their minds the question of what this helping hand could take away in the process if it is not implemented well and under meaningful human control.51

#### AI can increase stability in the nuclear realm by executing routine tasks far more accurately

Horowitz, Scharre and Velez-Green 19 – Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Scharre is Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Alexander Velez-Green is a defense analyst based in Washington, DC.

Michael C. Horowitz, Paul Scharre, and Alexander Velez-Green, December 2019, “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence,” https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1912/1912.05291.pdf

In spite of these risks, automation overall has tremendous potential advantages for improving safety and reliability in a variety of applications, including nuclear operations. Automated systems can execute routine tasks more precisely and reliably than humans and are not subject to fatigue or distraction. This is why automation is undoubtedly a major factor in improvements in airline safety.141 Self-driving cars likewise have tremendous potential to reduce automobile accidents, which kill over 30,000 people annually in the United States alone.14

#### AI in nuclear weapons enhances decision times lowering chances of escalation

Spindel 20 – Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of New Hampshir

Jeniffer Spindel, August 17 2020, “Artificial intelligence and nuclear weapons: Bringer of hope or harbinger of doom?” European Leadership Network, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/bringer-of-hope-or-harbinger-of-doom-artificial-intelligence-and-nuclear-weapons/

Artificial intelligence could be a boon for drudgery type tasks such as data analysis. AI could monitor and interpret [geospatial](http://news.aag.org/2019/03/ai-and-gis-finally-delivering-on-the-promise/) or [sensor](https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2020/02/14/6-ways-ai-can-make-sense-of-sensor-data-in-2020/) data, and flag changes or anomalies for human review. Applied to the nuclear realm, this use of AI could be used to track reactors, inventories, and nuclear materials movement, among other things. Human experts would thus be free to spend more of their time investigating change, rather than looking at data of the status quo.

Incorporating artificial intelligence into early warning systems could create time efficiencies in nuclear crises. Similar to the boon for data analysis, AI could improve the speed and quality of information processing, giving decision-makers more time to react. Time is the commodity in a nuclear crisis, since nuclear-armed missiles can often reach their target in as little as [eight](https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/29/us/nuclear-missiles-warning-system-and-the-question-of-when-to-fire.html) [minutes](https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/a-different-use-for-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-weapons-command-and-control/). Widening the window of decision could be key in deescalating a nuclear crisis.

**Nuclear superiority causes crisis stability.**

**Chilton 18**

Gen Kevin P. Chilton, Fmr. USAF four-star General and Commander of STRATCOM, Senior Fellow with the National Defense University, Defending the Record on US Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26333874

“We Do Not Need a Triad” The critical question to ask in response to the claim that we do not need a triad is, so which leg do you want to eliminate? The submarine leg provides the only stealth force we have—in essence, our assured response. The bombers are the flexible force that can signal our adversaries and assure our allies while encouraging them not to build their own nuclear deterrent. The ICBM is the most stabilizing leg of the triad. **Stability**, in this context, is defined as a state in which adversaries are **never tempted to strike first**. If in the future we eliminated all our ICBMs and deployed only a dyad, as has been proposed by some, that would leave only six targets that Russia or China would have to hold at risk in the United States to eliminate our entire nuclear arsenal save for the handful of submarines deployed at sea that day. After destroying those six targets with just six warheads of the 1,550 accountable warheads they are permitted to deploy by the New Start Treaty, Russia would have 1,544 warheads remaining and the US would only have a small subset of its force remaining. Eliminating or even **de-alerting** the ICBM leg of the triad would yield an **unstable relationship with Russia** because the **resulting vulnerability of our posture** in this scenario could very conceivably “**invite” a first strike** upon the US. The value in the triad is that it complicates the adversary decision calculus. Every day we want Vladimir **Putin** or some future Russian to know it is going to take two or more warheads per silo to eliminate our ICBM force. That requires at least 800 of the 1,550 available to them dedicated to targets in remote sections of North Dakota, Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming. Significantly, he must consider that more than half his offense would be required to go after missiles that might not be there when the warheads arrive because of our ability to launch under attack. He **must conclude** that a first strike would not only **fail** to achieve his objectives but also would be **suicidal**. Again, **this is the definition of strategic stability**: when an adversary understands that **no day is a good day** to go to war with the United States—nor is he **ever tempted** to launch first. When people say a dyad is a good idea and eliminating the ICBMs is a good idea because it makes for a safer America, recognize that they do not properly understand this concept of strategic stability. The United States should never want to invite a first strike by decreasing the number of targets an adversary must attack. **Deterrence** works **because** the ICBMs are **on alert** and **strategic stability** is maintained **because** the adversary knows missiles can **launch on warning.** “Nuclear Forces Are on Hair-Trigger Alert” In the era of “good cowboy versus bad cowboy” TV shows and movies, “**hair-trigger**” was used to describe a gun with a filed-down firing mechanism that was so sensitive it just might discharge whether the holder desired it to fire or not. Critics of our ICBM alert posture use this terminology as a scare tactic. People who described our ICBMs as being on “hair-trigger” alert either **do not know what they are talking about** or are intentionally attempting to **frighten the uninformed** into calling for the de-alerting of the ICBM leg. Here is a more accurate analogy that better captures reality: There is a gun, and it has a really big round in the chamber. **But the gun is in a holster and that holster has two locks on it**. Now the person wearing the holster does not know the combination to either lock—only the president of the United States has the combinations. If the president tells this person to shoot he will, but **he cannot do it alone**. **So nuclear forces are not on hair-trigger alert**. They **certainly are** **on alert and at the ready**, and this is **necessary to provide** the **strategic stability** described above.

**The turn is theoretically backwards.**

**Hersman 17**

Rebecca Hersman, senior adviser in the International Security Program and the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, William Caplan, a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, Bert Thompson, Bad Idea: De-Alerting U.S. ICBMs, December 2017, <http://defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Hersman_De-Alert-ICBMs_Bad-Idea.pdf>

However, if the warheads were de-alerted, de-mated, and put into secure storage facilities at each of the three ICBM bases in the Midwest, the number of warheads required to eliminate the U.S. ICBM force drops significantly. This frees up the rest of the adversary’s nuclear arsenal to target U.S. bomber bases and strategic submarines. This shift may change the adversary’s calculus and create an overwhelming incentive for the adversary to attempt a first strike on our nuclear arsenal. Ultimately this undermines the deterrent value **of our nuclear force** across the board, which has widespread geopolitical implications. If an adversary perceives that the United States does not have the capability to quickly and immediately respond to a nuclear attack, it may decide to **behave more** aggressively **towards both the U.S. and its allies**. There would be little incentive **for adversaries to** reciprocate **our posture in this instance** and, **even if publicly they did so**, the **inability to** verify that they have de-alerted their forces means the **risk of first strike would remain.**

Removing our arsenal from alert status does not reduce its vulnerability to cyber attacks, nor does it allow for more thoughtful decision making during a crisis. The practical effect of de-alerting is to diminish the role **of the ICBM leg of the nuclear triad to the point of** irrelevance**.** By eliminating the ICBMs as a rapid response force, de-alert proponents are essentially arguing for a nuclear posture that is less responsive, more defensive, and more closely resembles a dyad with bombers and nuclear submarines.

## OFF

### 2AC---T-Across Board

#### W/M : Plan alters the scope of antitrust by repealing the AmEx decision---that alters EVERY SECTOR.

#### W/M: Plan text in a vacuum---garnering violations off normal means is arbitrary.

#### C/I: “Expand the scope of its core antitrust laws” requires modifying the applicability of the antitrust laws by a part of the private sector

Kovacic et al. 03 – Professor at George Washington University Law School

William E. Kovacic, Theodore B. Olson, R. Hewitt Pate, Paul D. Clement, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, Nancy C. Garrison, David Seidman, Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Verizon Communs. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 2003 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 513, Supreme Court of the United States, May 2003, LexisNexis

Conversely, the 1996 Act does not expand the scope of the antitrust laws to outlaw conduct that, but for the 1996 Act, would not violate the antitrust laws. Such an expansion of Sherman Act duties would "modify \* \* \* the applicability of \* \* \* the antitrust laws" in contravention of 47 U.S.C. 152 note. Violations of the duties imposed by the 1996 Act are just that--violations of the 1996 Act, subject to the sanctions and penalties imposed by that Act. They do not automatically amount to treble-damages antitrust claims. The courts of appeals are again in accord. Pet. App. 29a; Covad, 299 F.3d at 1283 ("We agree with Goldwasser that merely pleading violations of the 1996 Act alone will not suffice to plead Sherman Act violations."); Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 400 (It is "both illogical and undesirable to equate a failure to comply with the 1996 Act with a failure to comply with the antitrust laws."); Cavalier Tel. Co., 2003 WL 21153305, at \*11-\*12 (similar).

#### C/I: The core antitrust laws just means sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.

The Antitrust Division 07 – Law enforcement agency that enforces the U.S. antitrust laws

“Antitrust Division Statement Regarding the Release of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report,” The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, April 2007, https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press\_releases/2007/222344.htm

The AMC has made many specific recommendations in its report, and the Division is in the process of reviewing all of them. The Division commends the AMC for its three primary conclusions:

Free-market competition should remain the touchstone of United States' economic policy. The Commission's conclusion in this regard is a fundamental starting point for policy makers. Over a century of experience has shown that robust competition among businesses, each striving to be increasingly successful, leads to better quality products and services, lower prices, and higher levels of innovation.

The core antitrust laws—Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 and Clayton Act section 7—and their application by the courts and federal enforcement agencies are sound and appropriately safeguard the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

New or different rules are not needed for industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological innovation are central features. Unlike some other areas of the law, the core antitrust laws are general in nature and have been applied to many different industries to protect free-market competition successfully over a long period of time despite changes in the economy and the increasing pace of technological advancement. One of the great benefits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is their adaptability to new economic conditions without sacrificing their ability to protect competition.

#### The term “prohibition” includes indirect coercion and penalties.

Whyte 19 – Former Chief Legal Counsel, Montana Department of Revenue

Daniel J. Whyte, Brief of Respondents, Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 2019 U.S. Supreme Court Briefs Lexis 6391, Supreme Court of the United States, November 2019, LexisNexis

I.A The Free Exercise Clause bars laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of "religion." This Court has held that the term "prohibition" covers not only direct bans on religious practice, but also "indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion." Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Trinity Lutheran, this Court held that when a church was barred from receiving a generally available benefit, it was penalized for being a church, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

#### 6. “The” is a specifying term.

Random House 6 (Unabridged Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)

The (used, esp. before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

#### Prefer ---

#### Overlimiting—their interp arbitrarily excludes every core aff on the topic – undermines AFF innovation and causes unbeatable pics.

#### Precision—only we have ev in the legal antitrust context – private sector entirely alternations is not how it worked

#### Reasonability – good is good enough, competing interpretations cause a race to the bottom, crowd out substance, and arbitrarily exclude the aff

### 2AC---K

#### The AFF wins if they win that their political paradigm is good---anything else lets the NEG moot 8 minutes of 1AC offense and places unfair and unpredictable burdens upon the AFF that weaken content retention and discourages future research.

#### 2. The AFF outweighs---

#### U.S. hegemony undergirds the liberal international order and has provided the greatest era of peace --- any deviance risks violent transition wars and allied confidence demise that escalates hotspots in East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

#### Outweighs the K --- endlessly repeating that “heg causes violence” is NOT a *substitute for impact calculus* --- some violence matters more, and war is conceptually distinct!

Barkawi 12 (Tarak Barkawi, PhD in Political Science, Reader in the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, “Of Camps and Critiques: A Reply to ‘Security, War, Violence’,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies September 2012 vol. 41 no. 1 124-130)

A final totalising move in ‘Security, War, Violence’ is the idea that the study of war should be subsumed under the category of ‘violence’. The reasons offered for this are: violence does not entail a hierarchy in which war is privileged; a focus on violence encourages us to see war in relational terms and makes visible other kinds of violence besides that of war; and that the analysis of violence somehow enables the disentangling of politics from war and a proper critique of liberal violence.22 I have no particular objection to the study of violence, and I certainly think there should be more of it in the social sciences. However, why and how this obviates or subsumes the study of war is obscure to me. Is war not historically significant enough to justify inquiry into it? War is a more specific category relative to violence in general, referring to reciprocal organised violence between political entities. I make no claims that the study of war should be privileged over that of other forms of violence. Both the violence of war, and that of, say, patriarchy, demand scholarly attention, but they are also distinct if related topics requiring different forms of theorisation and inquiry. As for relationality, the category of war is already inherently relational; one does not need the concept of violence in general to see this. What precisely distinguishes war from many other kinds of violence, such as genocide or massacre, is that war is a relational form of violence in which the other side shoots back. This is ultimately the source of war’s generative social powers, for it is amidst the clash of arms that the truths which define social and political orders are brought into question. A broader focus on violence in general risks losing this central, distinctive character of the violence of war. Is it really more theoretically or politically adequate to start referring to the Second World War as an instance of ‘violence’? Equally, while I am all for the analysis of liberal violence, another broad category which would include issues of ‘structural violence’, I also think we have far from exhausted the subject of liberalism and war, an important area of inquiry now dominated by the mostly self-serving nostrums of the liberal peace debates.

#### Even if they win an epistemology DA --- explaining the absence of war among great powers means making *relative* not *absolutist claims* --- winning heg bad requires them to *defend an alternative*.

Wohlforth 12 (William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Nuno Monteiro. “’Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful.’ Reviewed by William Wohlforth” October 31st, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR17.pdf)

Third, setting up the article as a claim that unipolarity is not peaceful runs into a problem: Unipolarity is peaceful. The Most Peaceful. Ever. Period. No one expects any imaginable anarchic inter-state system to be perfectly peaceful, with no war at all. In my 1999 paper, I stressed that “unipolarity does not imply the end of all conflict... It simply means the absence of two big problems” — hegemonic rivalry and counter-hegemonic balancing—that were present in all earlier systems. As a result “unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers.” Like any statement about the war-proneness of any international system, this is a relative claim. International relations scholarship does not have theories that make anything other than relative predictions about the war-proneness of systems. Monteiro tries but fails to escape this reality. He writes: “Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature (12). The latter portion of this sentence is exactly right, but the former bit is contradicted just a few pages later when Monteiro presents evidence that “Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all systems .. .“ (18). While conflict researchers debate the causes, they are nearly united in agreeing that the post-1990 international system is the least afflicted by war.5 There are many ways to measure war: the overall number that occur, the number of people killed, the probability that any state will be at war in any year, the size or cost of military forces compared to economic output or population, or, perhaps best, the probability that any individual will die as a result of organized inter-group violence. By all those measures, we are living in the most peaceful period since the modern inter-state system took shape in the seventeenth century. Indeed, Stephen Pinker assembles masses of evidence to suggest that there has never been a less violent time in all of human history.6 It is hard to think of any way to measure war that does not show the unipolar period as remarkably peaceful— except for the ones Monteiro uses: “the percentage of years that great powers spend at war, and the incidence of war involving great powers,” (18) with the United States defined as the only great power after 1990. That is a very convoluted way to say ‘Iraq and Afghanistan.’ The fact that the United States ended up in two grinding counter-insurgency operations in no way contradicts the claim that unipolarity is unprecedentedly peaceful. But that reaction concerns the framing rather than the substance of the article. One can dismiss as America-centric the claim that unipolarity is war-prone and still regard Monteiro’s carefully crafted arguments as promising advances. Further investment in refining and evaluating these arguments is warranted, for even if we agree that unipolarity has been pretty darned peaceful, it surely doesn’t seem that way to anyone in or around the U.S. military. Along with most security scholars, I’ve regarded the post-1991 military interventions as permitted but not dictated by unipolarity. That at least leaves open the possibility of strategic learning, as happened back in biplolarity. Even though the bipolar structure and U.S. grand strategy remained constant, bloody conflicts in Korea and Vietnam prompted Washington to get out of the direct military intervention business in favor of proxy wars and less costly covert operations. Similarly, the new “Iraq syndrome” might tame interventionist impulses even as unipolarity endures. But Monteiro’s message is gloomier. “The significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades,” he warns, “will continue as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.” (38). That’s a scary message even if that “significant level” is far lower than in any other known interstate system. So while I hope Monteiro is wrong, there is no doubt that his article has decisively altered the terms of the debate on this crucial issue.

#### Their ethics are tautological --- competing rights claims collapse --- the only option is to maximize lives saved.

Greene 10 (Joshua Greene, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings,” Historical and Contemporary Readings, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf))

What **turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that** human **moral judgment is not a** pristine **rational enterprise**, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, **they don't** really **explain** what's distinctive about **the philosophy in question**.

#### 3. China is revisionist—Empirics, internal doctrines and proximity guarantees China’s revisionist and a challenge for the U.S. – our threat isn’t constructed.

Choi 18

Ji Young Choi, Associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University. “Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84.

I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, historical and theoretical lessons reveal that a rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former's economic and other major capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter's leadership and the international rules it created. This means that the rise of China could produce intense hegemonic competition and even a global hegemonic war. The preventive motivation by an old declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with other variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly emerging yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system leader, as in the case of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A historical lesson is that "incomplete catch-ups are inherently conflict-prone" (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that even though it falls short of surpassing the system leader, the rise of a new great power can produce significant instability in the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the United States and China are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the possibility that one of these regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war in which the two superpowers are entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied sixteen historical cases in which a rising power confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not unavoidable, but escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia 2009; Wang and Zhu 2015), who emphasize the transformation of China's domestic politics and the pragmatism of Beijing's diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China relations. Yet my reading of the situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between this optimistic view and what has really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist state, but in what follows I will suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at least in the Asia Pacific and could develop into a revisionist power in the future.

Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization since the start of pro-market reforms in the late 1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in international security issues for several decades. It followed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine: "hide one's capabilities, bide one's time, and seek the right opportunity." Since 2003, China's motto has been "Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development," and Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of China would not threaten any other countries. Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in international security affairs. In particular, China has been adamant about territorial issues in the East and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a severe threat by other nations in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased naval activities on a large scale in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, Beijing announced that just like Tibet and Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical changes as well. In 2010, China's foreign minister publicly stated, "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also used the words "struggle and achieve results," emphasizing the importance of China's territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167). Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in the South China Sea to seek "de facto control over the resource-rich waters and islets" claimed as well by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times 2015). As of now, China's strategy is to delay a direct military conflict with the United States as long as possible and use its economic and political prowess to pressure smaller neighbors to give up their territorial claims (Doran 2012). These new developments and rhetorical signals reflect significant changes in China's foreign policies and signify that China's peaceful rise seems to be over.

A rising great power's consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as one of the significant signs of the rising power's dissatisfaction with the existing order and its willingness to do battle if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), "arms buildups and arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage." Werner and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger's military expenditures are increasing faster than those of a system leader, parity can be very dangerous to the international political order. China's GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet. China's military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the United States. In addition to its air force, China's strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers (Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military, particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015).

Sea power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained cogently in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new hegemonic power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective control of main international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly emerging power, as well as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy's rapid growth requires external expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products. Therefore, naval power becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities. Second, securing major sea-lanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the supply of energy, raw materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a hegemonic war or any other major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable why China is so stubborn over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history tells us that many rising powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all the global hegemons including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers.

Another important aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing international economic order and take actions that could potentially change this order. The Chinese economy has overall benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its allies and China does not have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in Washington, DC, and the United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along with other emerging economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing system of the IMF, but reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have been delayed by the opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took the initiative to create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is premature to say that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, this new development can be read as a starting point for significant changes in global economic and financial governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II (Subacchi 2015).

#### 4. No prior questions

Bleiker, professor of IR – University of Queensland, ‘15

(Roland, “Pluralist Methods for Visual Global Politics,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* vol. 43, no. 3, p. 872-890)

A genuinely interdisciplinary and pluralistic approach to the study of images in global politics can only be employed once one abandons the idea that all methods have to operate according to the same rules and standards of evidence; that is, once one abandons the notion of an overarching framework that can regulate all the various inquiries. As opposed to prevailing assumptions, there is no logical link between certain methods and certain epistemological positions. Methods are tools to understand the world and epistemologies are assumptions about the values that should be attached to the knowledge that these tools produce.

This is why methods cannot be employed or understood without a proper engagement with methodologies – a point that is being made increasingly by international relations scholars working on critical approaches to methods. John Law and John Urry, Lene Hansen, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Patrick Jackson, Michael Shapiro, Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans all stress that methods are inevitably intertwined with the strategies that these methods employ and the context within which they are carried out.42 The task of methodologies is to challenge the idea of methods as neutral techniques and to reflect upon the choices and implications that they embody. Implied – and at times explicitly articulated – in these positions is the idea that one can embark on systematic and rigorous research even while one accepts that there are several, and at times even incompatible, models of doing so. Although still fairly controversial in international relations, such critical positions on methodology are not new. They have long been debated in the philosophy of science or in quantum and complexity theory. Consider, just as an example, how Paul Feyerabend argued 40 years ago that the numerous procedures that make up the sciences have no common structure and that, as a result, ‘successful research does not obey general standards; it relies now on one trick, now on another’.43 He presents the violation of existing basic rules as the very process through which science progresses – not towards a new and better paradigm, but towards a recognition that science, and the methods it applies, is always incomplete and bound by its social context.

The concept of assemblage thinking provides a particularly useful way of anchoring a pluralist approach to the study of visual politics.44 It offers the kind of framework that can assess how images work in intertwined ways across their construction, content and impact. While ideally suited to capturing the complex politics of images, an assemblage approach has wider implications for the study of global politics.

Assemblages can be defined in their opposition to totalities. The latter are systems of thought based on relations of interiority. Manuel DeLanda stresses that in such systems each component has to behave according to a central logic that structures the movement of parts.45 The above positivist methods textbook is a key example of such a coherent and clearly delineated system: it is structured according to an overall logic, that of social science as a science. To make sense and fit in, each methodological component of this system has to operate according to the same principles: those of testable hypotheses. Methods that do not fit these criteria are seen as unscientific and illegitimate.

Assemblages offer a clear alternative to totalities and thus a conceptual base for a pluralist approach to the study of images. This is the case because an assemblage, according to DeLanda, is structured by relations of exteriority: the properties and behaviour of its components neither have to explain the whole nor fit into its overall logic.46 Heterogeneity is a key feature here, for each component is both linked and autonomous. Law and Urry as well as Aradau and Huysmans speak of ‘messy’ methods, but this does not mean that individual inquiries cannot be, at the same time, meticulous, thorough and systematic.47 The key is that the criteria by which they operate are seen as being independent of their specific purpose. An embrace of a post-positivist epistemology is an inevitable side-product of assemblages: an attempt to refuse totalities and embrace life and the political as a decentred, heterogeneous alignment of emerging and constantly moving parts.48 Epistemological positions are then no longer linked to particular methods, but to the value claims that are attached to them. A discourse analysis can be part of a positivist totality, just as a quantitative survey can become integrated into a post-positivist approach – as long as the respective claims to knowledge are seen as contingent and are not advanced in reference to an allegedly value-free and overall frame of reference.

The contours of a genuine multidisciplinary framework now become visible. Once the logic of totality is forgone, it becomes possible to combine seemingly incompatible methods, from ethnographies to semiologies and experiential surveys. The logics according to which they operate do not necessarily have to be the same, nor do they have to add up to one coherent whole. My position here differs from interdisciplinary approaches in visual culture that promote multiple methods but then seek to unite them through a synthesis, whether this is an ‘integrated framework’,49 a ‘systematic framework’50 or a ‘deeper holistic understanding of the world’.51

#### 5. Perm do both.

**6. American military force key to prevent genocidal violence – their reactionary “anti-Imperial” ethics sanction authoritarian intervention and condemn millions to death**

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Shadi Hamid, “Is a Better World Possible Without U.S. Military Force?,” The Atlantic, October 18, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/american-intervention-syria/504512/>.

The eight years of the Obama presidency have offered us a natural experiment of sorts. Not all U.S. presidents are similar on foreign policy, and not all (or any) U.S. presidents are quite like Barack Obama. After two terms of George W. Bush’s aggressive militarism, we have had the opportunity to watch whether attitudes toward the U.S.—and U.S. military force—would change, if circumstances changed. President Obama shared at least some of the assumptions of both the hard Left and foreign-policy realists, that the use of direct U.S. military force abroad, even with the best of intentions, often does more harm then good. Better, then, to “do no harm.”

This has been Barack Obama’s position on the Syrian Civil War, the key foreign-policy debate of our time. The president’s discomfort with military action against the Syrian regime seems deep and instinctual and oblivious to changing facts on the ground. **When the debate over intervention began, around 5,000 Syrians had been killed. Now it’s close to 500,000.** Yet, Obama’s basic orientation toward the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has remained unchanged. This suggests that Obama, like many others who oppose U.S. intervention against Assad, is doing so on “principled” or, to put it differently, ideological grounds.

Despite President Obama’s very conscious desire to limit America’s role in the Middle East and to minimize the extent to which U.S. military assets are deployed in the region, there is little evidence that the views of the hard Left and other critics of American power have changed as a result. (Yes, the U.S. military is arguably involved in more countries now than when the Obama administration took office, but—compared to Iraq and Afghanistan before him—Obama’s footprint has been decidedly limited, with a reliance on drone strikes and special-operations forces.) As for those who actually live in the Middle East, a less militaristic America has done little to temper anti-Americanism. In the three countries—Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon—for which Pew has survey data for both Bush’s last year and either 2014 or 2015, favorability toward the U.S. is significantly worse under Obama today than it was in 2008. Why exactly is up for debate, but **we can at the very least say that a drastic drawdown of U.S. military personnel**—precisely the policy pushed for by Democrats in the wake of Iraq’s failure—**does not seem to have bought America much goodwill.**

Despite the fact that Assad and Russia are responsible for indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, many leftists have viewed even the mere mention of the U.S. doing anything in response as “warmongering.” We have had the unfortunate situation of someone as (formerly) well-respected as Jeffrey Sachs arguing that the U.S. should provide “air cover and logistical support” to Bashar al-Assad. We have had Wikileaks’ attacks on the White Helmets, who have risked—and, for at least 140, lost—their lives in the worst conditions to save Syrian lives from the rubble of Syrian and Russian bombardment. Of course, it is not an absurd position to be skeptical of any proposed American escalation against Assad, and many reasonable people across the political spectrum have made that case. But **it is something else** entirely **to apply such skepticism selectively to the U.S. and not to others, especially when the others in question deliberately target civilians as a matter of policy**. It can be a slippery slope. While no one would accuse Obama of liking Putin, coordinating with and enabling Russia in Syria is effectively U.S. policy. As the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen noted in February, well before the current disaster in Aleppo: “The troubling thing is that the Putin policy on Syria has become hard to distinguish from the Obama policy.”

The Left has always had a utopian bent, believing that life, not just for Americans, but for millions abroad, can be made better through human agency (rather than, say, simply hoping that the market will self-correct). The problem, though, is that **the better, more just world** that **so many hope for is simply impossible without the use of American military force**. At first blush, such a claim might seem self-evidently absurd. Haven’t we all seen what happened in Iraq? The 2003 Iraq invasion was one of the worst strategic blunders in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, it’s not clear what exactly this has to do with the Syrian conflict, which is almost the inverse of the Iraq war. In Iraq, civil war happened after the U.S. invasion. In Syria, civil war broke out in the absence of U.S. intervention.

What all of this suggests is that **attitudes toward the U.S. military**, and by extension the United States, **are often “inelastic,”** meaning that what the U.S. actually does or doesn’t do abroad has limited bearing on perceptions of American power. As a general proposition, many leftists, for example, seem to believe that there is something intrinsically wrong with the use of military force by the United States. **In other words, when America does it, it is a bad thing, irrespective of the outcomes** it produces, and therefore should be opposed outright. **There is rarely any real effort to explain why it’s bad**—after all, if it were purely a moral stand against the killing of innocents, the use of Russian or Syrian military force would have to be considered much worse.

**But, for the use of American power abroad to be intrinsically wrong or immoral, all uses of military force would have to be either immoral or ineffective**, or both. However, as a factual matter, **this is simply not the case.** There was no way to stop mass slaughter and genocide in Bosnia or Kosovo without U.S. military force, buttressed, as it should be, by broad regional or international consensus. In those two cases, a U.S.-led coalition acted. **In** those **cases where the international community did not act, genocide did**, in fact, **occur**, **as** we witnessed **in Rwanda**. What became clear then—and what has become clear once again in Syria—is that a world where others than the U.S. take the initiative to stop such slaughter does not exist, and is unlikely to exist at any point in the foreseeable future. While they may be less common, there are also cases where dictators will not only kill their own people but try to forcefully invade and conquer their neighbors. As in the first Gulf War, the gobbling up of Kuwait could not have been prevented without a U.S.-led coalition, again with broad international support.

The list goes on. From a moral standpoint, no one should have to suffer under the indignities of ISIS rule. From a strategic standpoint, having an extremist state the size of Indiana in the middle of the Middle East, needless to say, does not suggest the coming of a better, more secure world. While Obama was late to act against the organization and while the anti-ISIS campaign has been deeply flawed, the amount of territory that ISIS controls has been reduced significantly, due in large part to U.S. airstrikes, intelligence, and special-operations forces. No one, not Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or anyone else, was going to seriously confront ISIS without U.S. coordination and leadership, and it’s U.S. coordination and leadership that is facilitating the current battle for the Islamic State’s Iraqi stronghold in Mosul. This is the faulty—and ultimately quite dangerous—premise behind one of the founding assumptions of Obama’s foreign policy: that if the U.S. steps back, others will step in. Even when “others” do step in, the results are often destructive, since America’s allies and adversaries alike do not generally share its values, interests, or objectives.

Of course, U.S. military force may be necessary, but it can never be sufficient on its own. This is where the judgment, morality, and strategic vision of politicians and policymakers can make the crucial difference. The United States has not been the “force for good” that many Americans would like to think it’s been. There is a tragic history of intervention abroad that more Americans should be aware of, whether it’s overthrowing democratically elected leaders in Latin America or backing brutal dictators in the Middle East. **There is no reason to think the U.S. is necessarily doomed to repeat those mistakes indefinitely**. But **even if it was, there would still be instances where only U.S. military force could be counted on to stop genocide.**

The alternative to a proactive and internationalist U.S. policy is to “do no harm,” and this might seem a safe fallback position: Foreign countries and cultures are too complicated to understand, so instead of trying to understand them, let’s at least not make the situation worse. The idea that the U.S. can “do no harm,” however, depends on the fiction that the most powerful nation in the world can ever be truly “neutral” in foreign conflicts, not just when it acts, but also when it doesn’t. **Neutrality**, or silence, **is often complicity**, something that was once the moral, urgent claim of the Left. The fiction of neutrality is growing more dangerous, **as we enter a period of resurgent authoritarianism, anti-refugee incitement, and routine mass killing.**

This is the built-in contradiction of what might be called the “anti-imperialist Left.” They are against empire, and there is only one country powerful enough to reasonably be considered “imperial.” (Russia, of course, engages in bloody imperial ventures, but it gets a pass since it is acting against the United States.) **But to insist that the fundamental problem in today’s world is American imperialism is to have only the most outdated “principles”—**principles **that,** in the case of Syria, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and even Libya, **have left**, or would have left, **the most vulnerable and suffering without any recourse to safety and protection**.

If the United States announced tomorrow morning that it would no longer use its military for anything but to defend the borders of the homeland, many would instinctively cheer, perhaps not quite realizing what this would mean in practice. But that is the conundrum the Left is now facing. **A world without mass slaughter**, of the sort of we are seeing every day in Syria, **cannot ever come to be without American power**. But perhaps this will prove one of the positive legacies of the Obama era: showing that the alternative of American disinterest and disengagement is not necessarily better. For those, though, that care about ideology—holding on to the idea that U.S. military force is somehow inherently bad—more than they care about actual human outcomes, the untenability of their position will persist. That, too, will be a tragedy, since **at a time when many on the Right are turning jingoistic or isolationist, there is a need for voices that not just believe in U.S. power, but believe that that power**—still, for now, preeminent—**can be used for better, more moral ends.**

**No endless intervention**

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We may argue about the wisdom of invading Iraq in the first place. We can enter into what is now an extensive debate upon the success or failure of the 2007 “surge” or the advisability of withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq in 2010. But the **bottom line** remains: the experience of the Iraq invasion is a cautionary tale about the limits of U.S. power— however immense—to remake fractured polities. Afghanistan, where the U.S. has been fighting for 13 years without a conclusive victory over the Taliban, is another case in point. One might contend that the U.S. response to such failures should be to increase the human and financial resources it commits to “victory,” however defined: more troops, more budgetary outlays, permanent stationing of significant numbers of U.S. troops in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Putting aside the question of whether such a response would merely mire the U.S. even more deeply in never-ending conflict, there is **little evidence** that **the American public would support such a policy**. U.S. power is not just limited by its ability to shape developments on the ground; it is also limited by the necessity of creating and, more importantly, **sustaining domestic support** for costly foreign military ventures. Finally, there are **real financial limits to U.S. freedom of action**. After all, the U.S. already spends immense sums on defense; a major new military intervention would further increase the cost. The public might accept substantially higher taxes, sharply reduced expenditures, or the acquisition of even greater debt in a true national emergency. But there is **little taste to do so**, for the sake of yet another large-scale intervention in Iraq.

#### 7. Security in this context is good—Their theory purposefully denies objective threats for the sake of analytic clarity – examining whether threats are real and whether our security responses are ethical is the only effective middle ground

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Rita Floyd, “Introduction” in The Morality of Security, Cambridge Core, April 2019, pp 10-12, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108667814>.

Securitization has been heavily debated in the scholarly community. Among other things much discussion has focused on the issue of whether securitization is satisfied simply by audience acceptance of the securitizing move, or whether it has to involve extraordinary measures (Balzacq, Le´onard and Ruzicka, 2015). All securitization scholars accept, however, that security threats are socially and politically constructed, or in other words that: ‘Security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 204). This has allowed scholars to recognize what Jef Huysmans calls ‘the political force of security’ whereby ‘[s]ecurity is a practice not of responding to enemies and fear but of creating them’ (2014: 3). An exclusive focus on the constructedness of security means, however, that securitization scholars tend to ignore whether or not the threats that inform securitization are real or otherwise. And as Thierry Balzacq argues, this has had the disadvantage of securitization scholars overlooking the fact that securitizing moves that refer to ‘brute threats’ are more likely to succeed because, ‘to win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality’ (2011b: 13). Balzacq’s observation is important in the context of this book as it goes some way towards paving the way for the inclusion of objective existential threats into securitization analysis. As I will argue in this book, real threats are important for the purposes of just securitization theory as only these may constitute a just reason19 for securitization.

The Copenhagen School’s refusal to ‘peek behind [threat construction] to decide whether it is really a threat’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 204) and the just war tradition’s insistence on real threats as just causes, appear to suggest insurmountable differences at the meta-theoretical level between the two theories. Importantly, however, the Copenhagen School’s unwillingness to, as they put it, ‘peek behind’ threat construction, does not stem from a denial that real threats exist (after all Wæver (2011: 472) recognizes that ‘lots of real threats exist’),20 but from the belief that the study of threat construction is ultimately more fruitful than pondering the presence of real threats (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 213; Buzan et al., 1998: 204). Beyond this, the decision not to try and examine whether security threats refer to real threats is also – at least in part – driven by a strong normative conviction. Thus by focusing on the political force of security as opposed to whether or not threats are real, Wæver and the Copenhagen School highlight the fact that securitization is/was not inevitable; things could have been treated in a different way (for example, perceived threats could have been criminalized or simply politicized). This enables scholars following this logic to highlight that securitizing actors bear responsibility for framing things in this way. Wæver calls this ‘the politics of responsibility’ (2011: 472), which he explains as follows: ‘The securitization approach points to the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decisionmakers and activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?’ (Wæver 1999 cited in Wæver, 2011: 468; emphasis added).

The significance of the fact that securitization is a political choice cannot be overstated; however, it is also the case that decision-makers are likely to consider securitization the right political choice when they believe that they are in fact dealing with a real threat. In other words, the possibility of framing the issue differently will not be tempting if they believe that there is a real threat. Given that the Copenhagen School and their followers cannot tell them anything about the actual objective existence of the threat, the framework seems of limited persuasiveness here; it is simply the securitizing actor’s belief against the scholar’s argument that things could and perhaps should be different. Indeed the Copenhagen School recognizes ‘our inability to counter securitization (say, of immigrants) with an argument that this is not really a security problem or that the environment is a bigger security problem’ as the securitization approach’s ‘main disadvantage’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 206). I propose that if the ethical goal of securitization analysis is that securitizing actors take responsibility for their actions, then a better strategy is to begin by (helping them in) judging the objective existence of a threat, because unless there is a real threat, securitization is most definitely the wrong political and ethical choice. Importantly, however, as I argue in this book, the existence of a real threat does not automatically necessitate securitization (indeed this remains a political choice), neither does it – by itself – render it morally permissible; the presence of real threats is rather one important requirement for securitization to be justified. In other words, just securitization is informed by the idea that securitizing actors are not only responsible for choosing to securitize, they ought to be responsible for securitizing in an ethical manner. In my view, the fact that the original variant of securitization theory excludes objective existential threats not on ontological, but at least partially on normative grounds means that a variant of securitization theory that includes real threats is at least permissible, provided, of course, that a theoretical framework that shows how we can know that threats are real is delivered. In this book, such a framework is set out in Chapter 2. 21

[FOOTNOTE 21 BEGINS

1 Some scholars may object to the possibility of combining insights of opposed theories on the grounds of inconsistency – for example, critical security studies, with its postmodern roots, with insights gained from analytical, moral and political philosophy. Interestingly, Wæver has faced similar charges of inconsistency for combining elements that ordinarily don’t go together (notably, Wæver refers to himself as a poststructural realist). To these critics Wæver offers this persuasive riposte: ‘This criticism presupposes that these larger groups are internally consistent and mutually isolated. On the contrary, we all know numerous examples of internally consistent theories that draw on several traditions – and many more examples of theories that stay within their “box” and yet are horribly inconsistent. Therefore, investigations of the internal consistency and productivity of research traditions should focus on distinct theories, not loose collections hereof’ (Wæver, 2015:124). Generally speaking, I am critical of the tendency to confuse theory with ideology, and thus disallowing and discounting anything outside of one’s perceived and tightly regulated theoretical remit. In the past in IR such thinking has led to bad scholarship; thankfully now scholars are working to dispel artificially imposed dichotomies, such as that on the relationship between causation and discourse (Kurki, 2008).

FOOTNOTE 21 ENDS]

#### 8. Chinese influence turns all AFF impacts – replicates every harm of imperialist expansion – they cannot win that Western influence is worse

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Linus, with Astrid H. M. Nordin, International Studies Review (2020) 22, 507–525. https://watermark.silverchair.com/viz023.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW\_Ercy7Dm3ZL\_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAp0wggKZBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKKMIIChgIBADCCAn8GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMGd0SwMLngLZCIDJuAgEQgIICUHEiXM7IxbN8RR3msRM65fTfA8GZ3rN9LUsR4-F2f\_-Kja0KtVKojOPojOI7HWWgZX5gNtMbGe-rFPeXuRn79jnZ\_pcC59VxNeC6OBrvISJGqNws2L-J8mFL30ObDqRExoy4IQM2PQ8s0\_GUOSWjUXm5sXwb1ulj7287Q8e8tJUsBB0VrxdNTn4jifzzEodBfGuzt1zgI6iehQ5CelUoCve51rG8HuO-i7BaLS5XiJvFTIoAmUYAqVEhTXDko6BKsLOPMUyd5HQcxC-2Sd3xCNY-PQTdX4Xj1axYGIETDE65RPL6syl6oPXqOUDhO-gvrZC4H7zALH4Y1L2CKNGfTcj1Y4Y\_4VfOV1E-GmCJ3QC\_pFpI5hXiRqt6bih1X8lNSGQ2Gkdjgw5dFKXviehBbB3EeKtaPkbU25P2JSCp5FseU7d-UlgeCMr7ga0gaz5U\_Y-3sOEytDM7g-IwgZCoba0fClanu4Xhs7aSdvO1R3sk0hnRN6iVklfG7NokT3huDaTykID3C2bk4dkEaFd9565GMnA-gw7AtPOKu0aRKOJpcxoy4E6EqXs4wayQp5O9q-6JEBZZUNp53OMLsDo7u\_Unxg5ZqZifGUxds8RdiSsmq6IPVOxZWFmrPLsVZsXF8AzJ4zu6d1EVTFNZpHmbzFdKJjFqMvbfkpuZnPH3hecVlOY4Fwlg93W\_Qx3oiNdA4rGrixq2KA7yG0nciChNxFeOtXI6esYFIuOOl7N-Yd3wLS4zGeabCJs3gXbwyAmWoV2wvqRREtfzvqJmOuZAk7Y

In sum, the harmony discourse epitomizes China’s current attempt to exercise soft power. It relies on representational force and the dichotomization of a positive Chinese self and negative Western and Japanese others. This discursive logic forces domestic and international audiences to empathize and identify with harmonious China and against its disharmonious others. At the same time, there are already indications that such a harmony discourse in China is not necessarily benign but intertwines with hierarchal rule and calls to battle diversity.

Advocating Hierarchy through “Harmony”: The Case of the West

The first other to China’s “harmonious” self is thus the West. The dominant Chinese discourse on harmony, however, rarely recognizes that Western thought has its roots in Ancient Greece, which also strongly emphasized harmony as a virtue. A Euro- pean tradition of thinking about harmony can be traced from ancient philosophers such as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to Enlightenment thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Gottfried Leibniz, Friedrich Hegel, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen, as well as to more modern harmony advocates such as Wilhelm Weitling.

The infusion of harmony in the purported Greek roots of “Western civilization” can be exemplified by the ancient thinker who is often depicted as the Western equivalent to Confucius: Plato. Despite significant differences between their wider ideas, Plato’s account of harmony has striking and significant commonalities with that of Confucius. Both emphasized that social harmony could only be achieved if all parts of society fulfilled their proper roles and submitted to hierarchical rule. To Plato, moreover, a society was harmonious and just when its three classes of people (rulers, soldiers, and workers) did their own proper work in a unified hierarchical structure, and soldiers were ready to enforce rulers’ rule with violence when nec- essary (Plato 1987, 433a). Like Confucius, Plato believed that only elites, who had reached wisdom through education, could properly understand harmony (Smith 2010, 36). Beyond the handful of roles that he thought were useful to social order, Plato shared Confucius’ evaluation that “multiplicity leads to the bad and the ugly” (Cai 1999, 331). Moreover, like Confucius, he thought that correct understanding needed to be enforced through censorship (Plato 1987, 401a–b, 398a).

This cursory overview of the similarities between Platonic and Confucian thought shows that both the presence of thinking about harmony and its elaboration might be less uniquely Chinese than some Chinese commentators would have us believe. Moreover, thinking about harmony coincided with violent wars in both Ancient China and Ancient Greece. This suggests that in neither context was thinking about harmony a guarantee of peaceful and harmonious interactions.

Highlighting these ancient similarities is not to say that with modernity, a har- mony discourse disappeared from the Western tradition. Previous research has shown that recent European history abounds with talk about harmony. Moreover, such discourses of harmony have legitimized and enabled a range of activities, from mildly homogenizing nationalism to the military expansionism of Nazi Germany. In interwar Scandinavia, for example, harmony (harmoni) appears as part of “idyllizing and harmony-seeking nationalism,” expressed in wholesome physical activity in na- ture (Nielsen 1997, 68). Such a notion of harmony was also a significant ingredient in German fascist quests for the “genuine,” as exemplified first by harmony with na- ture and later by harmony with the racialized “Volk” itself (Mosse 2004, 147). Hitler used the rhetoric of “harmony” (Harmonie) to motivate his state based on racial segregation and hierarchy. In Mein Kampf, he wrote that “a certain harmony must be present” between mind and body (Hitler 1992, 370). In contrast to the harmo- niously beautiful Aryans, any apparent “harmony” among Jews was considered fake and said to vanish in the absence of a common enemy or threat (Hitler 1992, 274). This dichotomization of those who embodied proper harmony and those who did not legitimized and enabled extreme violence against those who fell on the wrong side of the divide. Moreover, audiences were attracted, or perhaps coerced, to the cause by having to decide whether they sided with the harmonizers or with those who were deemed in need of harmonization.

The discursive deployment of harmony is also evident in the wake of European colonialism, although it is a matter of debate whether it is a direct legacy of it. In Indonesia, for example, “nationalist idioms of harmony” resonate with local ef- forts to build harmony between Christian and Muslim communities (Acciaioli 2001, 107). Such efforts, however, have contributed to increased communal tensions by failing to recognize the heterogeneity of local settlements and insisting that a sin- gle people’s custom must be sovereign in each territory. Disputes between indi- genes and migrants have erupted into violence in many parts of the archipelago (Acciaioli 2001, 104, 107–8). Moreover, during Colombia’s nineteenth-century wars of independence, racial equality was declared in law in accordance with a “nation- alist mythology of racial harmony” (Lasso 2007, 9). However, the elite were able to maintain informal patterns of discrimination by impeding the formation of racially based political associations. In fact, the language of harmony helped to keep the disenfranchised “in their place” by recasting the expression of racial grievances as a mark of unpatriotic divisiveness, criminalized by elites who claimed that racial har- mony had already been achieved (Lasso 2007, 13, see also chapter 3). Similarly, the Catholic Church’s notion of “class harmony” legitimized inequality between classes as “natural” in twentieth-century Argentina. In this way, working class and social- ist notions of class struggle were suppressed. In the Argentinian case, a discourse of harmony was a precursor to illiberal, authoritarian, militarist, and quasi-fascist nationalist conservatism (Rock 1987, 286–87).

In sum, a harmony discourse is not unique to Chinese history of thought but also central to the cradle and development of Western traditions. To both Plato and Confucius, it was the duty of elites to elaborate ideas of harmony and the duty of those deemed inferior to submit to and obey the elites. The next steps in such logic, understood in this article as the exercise of soft power, are to label the disobe- dient disharmonious and in need of harmonization and to coercively enforce com- pliance by using the hard power of physical violence. This dichotomization makes audiences align with the harmonizers in word and deed or else be deemed also in need of violent harmonization. The section suggests that the soft power of harmony is potentially, although not necessarily, deeply authoritarian.

Justifying Militarism through “Harmony”: The Case of Japan

As seen above, Japan—particularly in its prewar and wartime incarnations—is the second other in relation to which China’s “harmonious” self is constructed. The Japan case echoes and reinforces the points made above about the West, and Japanese harmony discourses bear an uncanny resemblance to their contemporary Chinese equivalents.

During Japan’s wars in the 1930s and 1940s, the importance of harmony was established most definitively in the 1937 Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan (Kokutai no hongi). By 1945, the Bureau of Educational Reform—the entity in Japan’s Ministry of Education charged with thought control—had disseminated ap- proximately 2 million copies of the moral education textbook. The book’s aim was to “cultivate and awaken national sentiment and consciousness” (Hall 1949, 11). In his introduction to the English translation, Robert King Hall (1949, 8) characterizes Kokutai no hongi as “a literary expression of ideas . . . sincerely held by a very great majority of the Japanese.”

In brief, Kokutai no hongi set forth the official state doctrine on Japan’s civilization and international relations, as well as the mythology and belief systems on which they were based. The central notion was that Japan was “a nation united in harmony as a single large family” under the benign rule of a divine emperor. Moreover, the book dichotomously differentiated this Japanese “spirit of harmony” from Western individualism and egoism (Kokutai no hongi 1949 [1937], 93).

One chapter in Kokutai no hongi was devoted specifically to the concept of har- mony, which is deemed Japan’s “fundamental way” (Kokutai no hongi 1949 [1937], 93). Analogous to contemporary Chinese discourses, Kokutai no hongi singled out Japan as “a unique nation built on the harmony of all things” (Cross 2009, 84). At the same time—and in striking similarity to the Chinese notion of “harmo- nious society”—harmony was not merely a fact but also a goal. Only by secur- ing Japan’s essence could the nation be rejuvenated and overcome “old abuses,” “feudal fetters,” and the “ideological and social evils” that had allegedly been im- ported through foreign learning since the nineteenth century (Kokutai no hongi 1949 [1937], 51–52).

On the one hand, the book stressed harmony between races, much like the propa- ganda that was used to motivate Japanese imperialism in the guise of “Pan-Asianism” and the construction of a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Dai-to ̄a-kyo ̄eiken) (Hotta 2007). In this vein, foreign ministry spokesman Kawai Tatsuo stated in 1938, “The objective of Japanese expansion is . . . the realization of harmony and con- cord among the nations of East Asia and their common happiness and prosperity” (quoted in Culver 2013, 121). On the other hand, Kokutai no hongi reproduced the idea that social harmony could exist only if people played their natural and pre- determined social roles to uphold a hierarchical social order with the emperor at the apex (Kokutai no hongi 1949 [1937], 97–100). Many contemporary Japanese be- gan to envision a similar kind of harmony at the international level—or “harmony with the world” (Zumoto 1927, 14). Different actors probably meant rather differ- ent things in their advocacy of harmony (Goto-Jones 2005, 95), but as Japanese expansionism progressed, the favored recipe for building a harmonious world was increasingly to unify various parts of East Asia hierarchically under Japanese leader- ship. As William Swan (1996, 146) notes, this was intended to produce an “organi- cally functioning entity that would harmoniously follow the political and economic leadership of Japan.”

These grandiose and rather idealistic aims notwithstanding, the obvious flipside of the coin was the use of physical violence. Although Japanese rhetoric was meant to make audiences empathize and identify with the idea that harmonious Japan had the right to supremacy, the use of violence and military instruments of statecraft were frequently seen as justified to diminish resistance and secure the harmony sought. Kokutai no hongi clearly states: “War . . . is not . . . intended for destruction, overpowering, or subjugation of others . . . [but] for the bringing about of great harmony, that is, peace” (Kokutai no hongi 1949 [1937], 95). Accordingly, those who challenged Japan’s harmonious cause risked being deemed disharmonious and in need of violent harmonization.

Although current identity discourses in Japan tend to differentiate the peaceful- ness of postwar Japan from the belligerency of its wartime incarnation (Hagström and Hanssen 2016; Hagström and Isaksson 2019), harmony has remained a central concept in the country. Japan’s identity discourse par excellence in the postwar pe- riod, the so-called Nihonjinron (or “theory about the Japanese”), is a case in point (Befu 2001, 22). However, Miyoshi and Harootunian (1993, 4) note that a kind of “gangsterism structurally enacts the rule of unity and conformity” in most segments of Japanese society. It does this through what we now recognize as the exercise of soft power, or the rhetorical force of dichotomizing the harmonious from the disharmonious: “One either accepts what he or she is told or becomes ostracized” (Miyoshi and Harootunian 1993, 4; see also Befu 2001, 19). Hirata and Warschauer (2014, 5) indicate that the quest for harmony can “cause harm” through the pro- duction of fear of and hostility toward those deemed disharmonious (Hirata and Warschauer 2014, 7–10).

Much as in the case of China, harmony is also emphasized in Japan’s official soft power campaigns (Heng 2010; Bukh 2014). These campaigns have in turn been crit- icized for their resemblance to the cultural politics of Japan’s interwar period—for essentializing Japanese culture and disregarding the ways in which cultures inter- mingle (Shimizu 2014, 696). Moreover, Daisuke Akimoto (2012) argues that the Abe government’s notion of “proactive pacifism” gives Japan a mandate to “har- monize” nonpeaceful countries. Although he does not advocate the use of mili- tary instruments, the gist of proactive pacifism is exactly that “our peace” must be safeguarded from “their belligerency”—if necessary with the help of military force (Hagström and Hanssen 2016).

In sum, Japanese wartime violence was legitimized and enabled in part through a harmony discourse that implied that war and occupation with harmonious con- sequences was possible and in the best interest of all “liberated” Asian nations. Decades before it was popularized, what is now termed soft power can thus be seen as having operated in discourses that portrayed it as harmonious Japan’s destiny to harmonize less harmonious others (cf. Akami 2014). Despite contemporary Japan’s efforts to make a clean break with this particular past, discourses on harmony con- tinue to enforce conformity there—in the final analysis through the use of physical violence.

The Soft Power of Harmony: Dangers and Possibilities

We have shown that the self/other dichotomization and representational force at play in historical harmony discourses in the West and Japan served to legitimize and enable a range of physically violent practices. Our examples indicate that such harmonization can enable and legitimize violence in different ways. The other to be harmonized can refer to various groups and actors that are deemed disharmonious: (a) for being inferior and therefore disturbing the harmonious self—for example, minorities; (b) for not clearly empathizing and identifying with the self who em- bodies harmony or for resisting that self—for example, political dissenters; and (c) for propagating alternative, distinctly disharmonious versions of world order—for example, external threats. The self then is related to the other differently, and uses force against the other for different reasons.

This section argues that much like the Western and Japanese cases, the harmony discourse that is part of Chinese soft-power campaigns and epitomizes China’s ex- ercise of soft power can also legitimize and enable hierarchical sociopolitical struc- tures, war, empire, and physical conquest, through the above ways of enabling and legitimizing violence. In other words, the exercise of soft power is likely to enable the use of hard power in the case of China too, and has already begun to do so do- mestically. Does the exercise of soft power inevitably legitimize and enable the use of hard power? The section ends by suggesting that soft power could be reconceptu- alized with the help of other Chinese interpretations of harmony in a way that may be helpful in severing the connection with hard power.

#### 9. Militarism can’t be reduced to a single cause – only pragmatic checks on excessive violence solves

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(Andrew J., *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, pg. 205-212)

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, “always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”1 Mencken’s aphorism applies in spades to the subject of this account. To imagine that there exists a simple antidote **to the “military metaphysic**” to which the people and government of the United States have fallen prey is to misconstrue the problem. As the foregoing chapters make plain, the origins of America’s present-day infatuation with military power are **anything but simple**. American militarism is not the invention of a cabal nursing fantasies of global empire and manipulating an unsuspecting people frightened by the events of 9/11. Further, it is counterproductive to think in these terms— to assign culpability to a particular president or administration and to imagine that throwing the bums out will put things right. Yet neither does the present-day status of the United States as sole superpower reveal an essential truth, whether positive or negative, about the American project. Enthusiasts (mostly on the right) who interpret America’s possession of unrivaled and unprecedented armed might as proof that the United States enjoys the mandate of heaven are deluded. But so too are those (mostly on the left) who see in the far-flung doings of today’s U.S. military establishment substantiation of Major General Smedley Butler’s old chestnut that “war is just a racket” **and the American soldier “a gangster for capitalism”** sent abroad to do the bidding of Big Business or Big Oil.2 **Neither the will of God nor the venality of Wall Street suffices to explain how the United States managed to become stuck in World War IV.** Rather, the new American militarism is a little like pollution—the perhaps unintended, but foreseeable by-product of prior choices and decisions made without taking fully into account the full range of costs likely to be incurred.

In making the industrial revolution, the captains of American enterprise did not consciously set out to foul the environment, but as they harnessed the waters, crisscrossed the nation with rails, and built their mills and refineries, negative consequences ensued. Lakes and rivers became choked with refuse, the soil contaminated, and the air in American cities filthy.

By the time that the industrial age approached its zenith in the middle of the twentieth century, most Americans had come to take this for granted; a degraded environment seemed the price you had to pay in exchange for material abundance and by extension for freedom and opportunity. Americans might not like pollution, but there seemed to be no choice except to put up with it.

To appreciate that this was, in fact, not the case, Americans needed a different consciousness. This is where the environmental movement, beginning more or less in the 1960s, made its essential contribution. Environmentalists enabled Americans to see the natural world and their relationship to that world in a different light. They argued that the obvious deterioration in the environment was unacceptable and not at all inevitable. Alternatives did exist. Different policies and practices could stanch and even reverse the damage.

Purists in that movement insisted upon the primacy of environmental needs, everywhere and in all cases. Theirs was (and is) a principled position deserving to be heard. To act on their recommendations, however, would likely mean shutting down the economy, an impractical and politically infeasible course of action.

Pragmatists advanced a different argument. They suggested that it was possible to negotiate a compromise between economic needs and environmental imperatives. This compromise might oblige Americans to curtail certain bad habits, but it did not require changing the fundamentals of how they lived their lives. Americans could keep their cars and continue their love affair with consumption; but at the same time they could also have cleaner air and cleaner water. Implementing this compromise has produced an outcome that environmental radicals (and on the other side, believers in laissez-faire capitalism) today find unsatisfactory. In practice, it turns out, once begun negotiations never end. Bargaining is continuous, contentious, and deeply politicized. Participants in the process seldom come away with everything they want. Settling for half a loaf when you covet the whole is inevitably frustrating. But the results are self-evident. Environmental conditions in the United States today are palpably better than they were a half century ago. Pollution has not been vanquished, but it has become more manageable. Furthermore, the nation has achieved those improvements without imposing on citizens undue burdens and without preventing its entrepreneurs from innovating, creating, and turning a profit.

Restoring a semblance of balance and good sense to the way that Americans think about military power will require a similarly pragmatic approach. Undoing all of the negative effects that result from having been seduced by war may **lie beyond reach**, but Americans can at least make them more manageable and thereby salvage their democracy. In explaining the origins of the new American militarism, this account has not sought to assign or to impute blame. None of the protagonists in this story sat down after Vietnam and consciously plotted to propagate perverse attitudes toward military power any more than Andrew Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller plotted to despoil the nineteenth-century American landscape. The clamor after Vietnam to rebuild the American arsenal and to restore American self-confidence, the celebration of soldierly values, the search for ways to make force more usable: all of these came about because groups of Americans thought that they glimpsed in the realm of military affairs the solution to vexing problems. The soldiers who sought to rehabilitate their profession, the intellectuals who feared that America might share the fate of Weimar, the strategists wrestling with the implications of nuclear weapons, the conservative Christians appalled by the apparent collapse of traditional morality: none of these acted out of motives that were inherently dishonorable. To the extent that we may find fault with the results of their efforts, that fault is more appropriately attributable to **human fallibility than to malicious intent**. And yet **in the end it is** not motive that matters but outcome. Several decades after Vietnam, in the aftermath of a century filled to overflowing with evidence pointing to the limited utility of armed force and the dangers inherent in relying excessively on military power, the American people have persuaded themselves that their best prospect for safety and salvation lies with the sword. Told that despite all of their past martial exertions, treasure expended, and lives sacrificed, the world they inhabit is today more dangerous than ever and that they must redouble those exertions, they dutifully assent. Much as dumping raw sewage into American lakes and streams was once deemed unremarkable, so today “global power projection”—a phrase whose sharp edges we have worn down through casual use, but which implies military activism without apparent limit—has become standard practice, a normal condition, one to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist. All of this Americans have come to take for granted: it’s who we are and what we do.

Such a definition of normalcy cries out for a close and critical reexamination. Surely, the surprises, disappointments, painful losses, and woeful, even shameful failures of the Iraq War make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy. Yet a meaningful reexamination will require first a change of consciousness, seeing war and America’s relationship to war in a fundamentally different way.

Of course, **dissenting views already exist.** A rich tradition of American pacifism abhors the resort to violence as always and in every case wrong. Advocates of disarmament argue that by their very existence weapons are an incitement to violence. In the former camp, there can never be a justification for war. In the latter camp, **the shortest road to peace begins with the beating of swords into ploughshares**. These are principled views that deserve a hearing, more so today than ever. By discomfiting the majority, advocates of such views serve the common good. But to make full-fledged pacifism or comprehensive disarmament the basis for policy in an intrinsically disordered world would be to open the United States to grave danger.

#### 9. Deterrence is valuable – our academic investment is key to address high-stakes technologies despite increased complexity

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(Jon and Erik, “Conclusion,” in *Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity*, ed. Jon Lindsay & Erik Gartzke, Oxford Scholarship Online, July)

Future Prospects

The ability to manage complexity has become critical in all aspects of modern life. Military affairs is no exception and may even be exemplary in this respect. Combined arms warfare is a form of operational complexity management, integrating different branches of the army into a coordinated fighting force. Joint Force operations extends this concept further with the integration of forces from all services, as (p.366) well as capabilities from the civilian intelligence community or other government agencies. The production of sophisticated weapons in the Joint Force “system of systems” relies on practices of engineering systems integration, a complementary form of complexity management focusing on coordinating different defense contractors and scientific disciplines. Each of these different complexity-management practices work together to field the panoply of weapons and organizations that enable the United States to realize, and China or Russia to contest, “command of the commons.” This brings us back to the problem with which CDD began, namely whether U.S. cross-domain prowess is being undermined by developments in space, cyberspace, and other arenas by actors like China and Russia, and whether other U.S. advantages might be brought to bear to compensate.

One way to think about CDD is by analogy to the problem of combined arms warfare, but applied to the level of foreign policy or grand strategy. Mastering combined arms operations often produced winners in combat on twentieth-century battlefields and enabled the United States to wield an effective form of dominance as military hegemon.31 In the same way, making sense of the different political properties of different coercive instruments and their combinations may enable some actors to exercise increased influence in the future by restoring the credibility of deterrence and assurance policies that have been undermined by the combination of political will and technological innovation. While difficult to anticipate in detail, technological changes will continue to create new threats in the future. Instead of reacting piecemeal to each new threat or capability, a strategic policy designed explicitly to address the problem of the ongoing rise in sociotechnical complexity would make it easier to accommodate, even anticipate, novel threats.

Policy Implications

The chapters in this book draw some conclusions of tentative policy relevance, all qualified by calls for future research. Schneider asks policymakers to consider whether the uncertainty of the cyber domain is a fixed fact or whether can it be manipulated through technological interventions or declaratory policy. If uncertainty is absolute, then states will have to settle for, or embrace, ambiguous deterrent policies. If instead uncertainty can be reduced or managed, for instance by means of new electromagnetic incursion technologies that are not as sensitive to revelation as many existing software weapons, then states can adopt more explicit declaratory policies.

(p.367) Morrow proposes an interesting application from his work on the common knowledge requirements of deterrence and the difficulty of meeting them, given the complexity of CDD:

[because] CDD seeks to link conduct across domains together, the demands of the system increase as the square of the number of domains, as noted. One way to reduce this complexity would be to designate one domain as the domain of retaliation. Standards of conduct could be set in the other domains, with the understanding that the responses to violations would all occur in the domain of retaliation, reducing the complexity of the resulting agreement. Conventional kinetic responses are one obvious domain for retaliation. But proportionality rears its head here. Is a kinetic attack appropriate after violations that do not kill people or destroy property? A second obvious domain for retaliation would be economic sanctions. This possibility confronts the concern that economic sanctions might not be a strong enough sanction to deter the worst breaches of agreed conduct. Designating a domain of retaliation simplifies the complexity of the understanding needed to support a system of CDD, but the obvious candidate domains of retaliation might not be sufficient to create effective deterrence.

Indeed, economic sanctioning appears to be the go-to choice for retaliation by the United States in cybersecurity. Targeted sanctions have been applied in response to Chinese economic espionage, North Korean blackmail in the case of Sony, and Russian electoral interference. Perhaps precisely because of the ineffectiveness of low-cost sanctions that Morrow mentions, a number of NATO nations recently opted to expel Russian intelligence personnel and diplomats in retaliation for the alleged Russian poisoning of a double agent in Britain.

It is unsurprising that the conversation about appropriate responses to CDD provocation (bearing in mind that strategic and normative appropriateness may not be the same) recurs with each new act of aggression. The recurrence of similar problems may reflect the incentives an attacker has to expand options and take new actions that are not clearly covered by explicit or tacit existing deterrents. Morrow recommends in response: “[the] parties will need to revise their understanding of where the lines between acceptable and unacceptable conduct will be, along with what responses are appropriate.” Unfortunately, this is in many ways a restatement of the problem of CDD rather than the solution. Indeed, governments that seek effective deterrence policies may ultimately have to make peace with the stability-instability paradox: “[the] employment of CDD entails an acceptance that under a system of CDD, low-level violations will occur and some retaliatory responses will happen.”

(p.368) Shifrinson raises an especially cogent policy implication of CDD, namely the importance of slowing down and leveraging the inherent complexity of CDD to generate information rather than rushing in with a half-formed understanding of the situation. This may be especially critical when one’s own priorities and values are not yet fully fleshed out. As Shifrinson explains, “[as] interests change, proceeding judiciously helps policymakers ensure that the effort to extend deterrence to new interests is actually a game worth playing. Equally important, playing for time enables policymakers to more carefully define the objective they are trying to secure and to more carefully link means—which might be poorly structured to secure this interest—to the interest at hand.” Rovner seems to agree with Shifrinson’s admonition. If Athens and Sparta had taken the time to appreciate the stability of the ancient cross-domain balance, perhaps they would not have rushed into war: “counterintuitively, speed may not always be of the essence,” Rovner writes. A pressing question is whether states relying on CDD can afford the luxury of waiting to make the second move, thereby allowing competitors to clarify their true interests.